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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the influence of cryptocurrencies in the context of risk management by considering the emerging risk
factors of Bitcoin as a payment method. By means of an empirical analysis through an online survey, the current opera-
tional dealing of incoming Bitcoin funds, the risk awareness of the potential threats, and the corresponding control activities
implemented by companies accepting Bitcoin payments have been examined. The results reveal that the risks of this new
technology-based payment method have not been extensively evaluated and that there exists a partially significant lack of
know-how. Therefore, the risks are either not at all or improperly addressed by a majority of the organizations. However,
the exchange rate risk and the cyber risk, which is a strongly linked to the administration of cryptocurrencies, represent the
most significant related risk factors associated with cryptocurrencies in recent times. To ensure an appropriate operational
dealing with cryptocurrencies, the author presents a risk control matrix based on the results of the analysis and discusses con-
trol activities to mitigate these emerging threats. Finally, a holistic Cryptocurrency IC Framework (following the COSO 2013
IC Framework) is presented, with the objective of effectively and efficiently developing and maintaining systems of internal
control with regard to cryptocurrencies.
Keywords: Blockchain; digital assets; Bitcoin; cryptocurrency; IC framework; enterprise risk management.
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem Statement & Research Questions
The 21st century is characterized by continuous changes
and the need for ongoing adaptation, with key terms like
"digitization” and "automatization" playing an increasingly
important role, particularly in the fast paced environment
of a company. These changes can in fact be observed in al-
most all industries, ranging from manufacturing businesses
to service providers. In these modified circumstances, with
the emergence of new opportunities, unfamiliar risks and
threats have also arisen. It is thus inevitable for companies
and their executive management teams to thoroughly think
through their implemented business models and, moreover,
to adapt to the changing conditions for continued growth
(Rüegg-Stürm and Grand, 2015, p. 78).
The concept of blockchain emerged in 2008 as an inno-
vative technology in the sphere of currencies and payment
methods. Initiated by the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto
(2008, pp. 1f.), the blockchain was a new idea for an elec-
tronic cash system based on cryptography resulting in the so-
called "cryptocurrencies." The concept aimed at transforming
how transactions were conducted, leading to fundamental
changes in the financial system and influencing its structures
behind. After the financial crisis of 2008, the related loss of
confidence in the prevailing financial system, and recent dis-
cussions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) about the
elimination of hard cash (IMF, 2017, pp. 4f.; Papadopoulos,
2015, p. 160), the cryptocurrencies have caught the atten-
tion of innumerable individuals, companies, and entire na-
tions.
There are several kinds of cryptocurrencies, and cur-
rently, the most famous and widespread is "Bitcoin." The
extent and prevalence of the nine-year-old cryptocurrency
can be demonstrated by its considerable market cap, which
was approx. USD 148 bn. as of February 4, 2018 (Coinmar-
ketcap, 2018, 20. January). According to recent statistics of
the Central Intelligence Agency (2018), this is equivalent to
the actual stock of narrow money (M1) of countries such as
Venezuela and Finland.
In general, Bitcoin can be used as medium of exchange or
as a storage of value, i.e., as an investment (de Jong, 2015, p.
416). Some retailers already accept Bitcoin as an additional
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payment method to purchase their goods and services. The
most frequently mentioned advantages of digital currencies
as a payment method are the speed, the price savings, and
the increased security of (global) transactions, without the
necessity for neither a customer nor a vendor to be a regis-
tered bank client and, moreover, without the involvement of
any financial institution in the transaction process (Bank for
International Settlement [BIS], 2015, p. 3).
At first glance, this innovation seems impressively pro-
gressive, as it is a payment process that is more efficient,
has almost no transaction fees, and has fewer intermedi-
aries. However, the novelty of the technology also intro-
duces uncertainty and unfamiliar risk factors for the partici-
pants of the system. Consequently, the enterprise risk man-
agement (ERM), particularly of companies and retailers ac-
cepting cryptocurrencies as a payment method, will face new
challenges.
Due to a lack of research on the appropriate handling
of cryptocurrencies in business operations, this thesis aims
at developing a holistic framework that supports companies
accepting cryptocurrencies in establishing an appropriate
risk management system for dealing with cryptocurren-
cies. Therefore, the following research questions will be
addressed:
• What are the potential risks and resulting threats of
accepting cryptocurrencies as a payment method?
• Are the companies and the responsible employees
aware of these risks, and how do they evaluate and
address them?
• Are there any general control activities and recommen-
dations necessary to ensure an appropriate risk man-
agement in the handling of cryptocurrencies?
1.2. Structure
This paper has been structured as follows: The introduc-
tion (Chapter 1) emphasizes the relevance of the topic, the
lack of research, and presents the research questions that will
be addressed in order to examine the influence of cryptocur-
rencies on risk management by the example of Bitcoin. Sub-
sequently, Chapter 2 presents an intensive literature review
on the topic of cryptocurrencies and ERM. Chapter 3 presents
the research approach adopted, which clarifies the research
concept and the methodology employed. On this basis, the
results containing the empirical investigation follow in Chap-
ter 4, which is divided into three linked sub-sections, one for
each of the three research questions. After the theoretical risk
identification process, the aspects of practical risk awareness
and risk handling will be analyzed. Based on the obtained
insights and results, the author provides general recommen-
dations in the form of a risk control matrix and establishes
a holistic Cryptocurrency IC Framework. Finally, the conclu-
sion in Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses this study and
identifies its limitations.
1.3. Empirical Approach
The empirical approach employed to investigate the
research questions was an online survey sent to a pre-
determined group of companies accepting Bitcoin payments.
Because of the small number of companies currently accept-
ing Bitcoin payments in Switzerland, the selection process
of the sample was not limited by any particular industry or
geographical region within Europe.
The survey contains qualitative and quantitative ques-
tions about the Bitcoin transaction process, Bitcoin adminis-
tration and the awareness as well as the evaluation of risk
factors arising from the use of cryptocurrencies. Further,
companies were also asked about the internal controls im-
plemented, if any, for their operational dealing of cryptocur-
rencies.
The evaluation of the survey responses will be conducted
in a descriptive manner. In this context, qualitative questions
will be assessed using the concept of inductive content anal-
ysis, whereas quantitative questions will be evaluated using
nominal, ordinal and interval scales.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Cryptocurrencies
"There are 3 eras of currency: commodity based,
politically based and now, math based."
Chris Dixon, 2015
2.1.1. Taxonomy
The story of forms of money can be traced back to the
early ages of mankind when people traded goods for valuable
commodities, such as seashells or cattle. Over time, several
other kinds of payment instruments emerged like metals or
coins, all of which were linked to their intrinsic value, de-
pending on their weight and purity. (Dombrowski, 2014, p.
9f.)
The introduction of paper money simplified the handling
and exchange of money, making transactions more conve-
nient. The value of the paper could be derived in various
ways, e.g., by pegging it to a scarce commodity like gold (the
former "gold standard") or what is commonly known as "fiat
money." The value of fiat money, such as the US Dollar, the
British Pound, or the European Euro is determined by "the de-
mand and supply of the nation’s currency and its acceptance
is enforced by the government through such means as declar-
ing it legal tender" (Dombrowski, 2014, p. 12). This implies
that its value depends on factors such as social convention
or future expectations of economic developments (Franco,
2014, pp. 4-5).
According to Nian and Chuen (2015, pp. 7-8), "there
are various socioeconomic forces that drive the demand for
alternative currencies," such as political instability, techno-
logical progress, or inefficiencies. An accumulation of these
factors might lead to dissatisfaction and consequently to a
loss of trust in national currencies and the financial system
M. Bölstler / Junior Management Science 4(2) (2019) 195-227 197
Figure 1: Structure of this Thesis; Source: Own illustration
Table 1: Comparison of Various Types of Currency; Source: Own illustration according to Greene and Shy (2014, p. 275)
Physical Digital
Government backed Cash E-Cash
Not government backed Private Money Virtual Currency
as a whole. A prime example of this was the financial crisis
of 2008. In order to establish an independent system that
aims at tackling the above-mentioned causes for the demand
of alternative currencies and the related discontent, Satoshi
Nakamoto (2008, p. 1) proposed the concept of the first
decentralized digital currency in a whitepaper entitled, "Bit-
coin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System."
Table 1 presents a classification of digital currencies as
proposed by Greene and Shy (2014, p. 275).
As can be seen in Table 1, there is a general distinction
between physical and digital currency. Additionally, there
is a differentiation between currency that is or is not gov-
ernment backed. According to the recent definition of the
US Government Accountability Office, "a virtual currency is
generally considered as a digital unit of exchange that is not
backed by governmental-issued legal tender" (United States
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA),
2016, p. 1), whereby its "value [is] stored electronically in a
device such as a chip card or a hard device in a personal com-
puter" (Bank for International Settlement [BIS], 2015, p. 4).
This declaration contradicts the basic property of e-cash, be-
cause it represents government-issued money; however, it is
even stored in the form of bits on a chip, like a chip card or
a mobile device (Green & Shy, 2014, p. 275).
To better understand a digital cryptocurrency and its
structure, it is important to keep in mind that a digital cur-
rency (or "virtual currency" as it is also known) describes the
"umbrella term," whereas "cryptocurrency" solely represents
a subset with specialized properties (Nian and Chuen, 2015,
p. 6). For instance, airline miles or tokens for online games
can be classified as digital currencies as well (Nian & Lee Kuo
Chuen, p. 8). Figure 2, reproduced from the IMF (2016, p.
8), presents an accurate taxonomy of virtual currencies.
Figure 2 can be summarized as follows: A cryptocurrency
• has no legal tender
• is a medium of exchange for "real-world" items or "real-
world" money
• has no central authority that controls and regulates the
money circulation
• uses mathematics, particularly cryptography, to vali-
date transactions.
Using the example of Bitcoin and its blockchain, the following
chapters will present an in-depth explanation of the structure
and application of Bitcoin as a payment method.
2.1.2. Bitcoin
We begin this section by pointing out the general distinc-
tion made between the two forms of this term, which are
commonly used in English- and French-speaking areas: "Bit-
coin" refers to the network and its technology, while "bitcoin"
refers to the unit of currency (Gisler, 2015, pp. 9-10).
Concept
The fundamental idea of Bitcoin is derived from the white
paper entitled "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash Sys-
tem," written by the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto in
2008. This paper illustrated the idea of a purely peer-to-peer
(P2P) version of electronic cash without the involvement of
any financial third parties (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1). Bitcoin
became the first decentralized digital currency, which implies
that there is neither a person nor an institution who is back-
ing, controlling, or regulating the currency (Franco, 2014,
pp. 3-4). Instead, Bitcoin "is shared by all network nodes,
updated by miners, monitored by everyone, and owned and
controlled by no one" (Swan, 2015, p. 1).
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of Virtual Currencies; Source: IMF (2016, p. 8)
Figure 3: The Bitcoin Value Chain; Source: Own illustration according to Bitcoin Foundation (2017)
Figure 4: Bitcoin Wallet Screenshot; Source: https://bitcoin.org/img/screenshots/xapo
Nakamoto (2008, p. 1) presented the idea of "an elec-
tronic payment system based on cryptographic proof in-
stead of trust." It aims at tackling the problems associated
with a centralized financial system and further protecting
buyers and sellers from fraud by means of the irreversibil-
ity of transactions as well as a P2P distributed timestamp
server structure. Moreover, it creates the possibility of reach-
ing the unbanked population and aims at eliminating the
disproportional remittance and exchange fees involved in,
especially, small-amount transactions. For instance, when
sending money to any African countries or when supporting
any micro-financing projects, the remittance bears the risk of
the transaction cost being higher than the amount originally
transferred (Nian and Chuen, 2015, pp. 13-23). Addi-
tionally, the proposed approach tackles the so far unsolved
double-spending problem in a distributed financial database
without the necessity of an intermediary who charges (high)
transaction fees for the validation, such as banks, credit card
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companies, or other established payment transmitters like
PayPal (Deloitte, 2016, p. 5; Franco, 2014, p. 6; Papadopou-
los, 2015, p. 158).
According to Papadopoulos (2015, p. 155), bitcoins are
the digital equivalent of cash, which is designed to transfer
"economic value across the internet." Basically, the concept
of Bitcoin can be compared with mining gold, whereby the
globally available amount of gold would be equal to the lim-
ited availability of bitcoins (Tindell, 2013, 5. March). To fur-
ther explain this comparison, the bitcoin "creation process" –
the so-called "mining" – is conducted by a decentralized P2P
network of computers working around the clock to solve dif-
ficult mathematical problems based on cryptographic hash
algorithms instead of gold miners physically digging for gold
(Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 175; Cusumano, 2014, p. 22).
When a mathematical problem is solved, the successful
miner(s) are rewarded in the form of bitcoins for providing
their processing power and the necessary energy. Finally, the
earned as well as the previously spent bitcoins are stored "in
a notional ledger held across many computers around the
world" (the blockchain) and not in underground vaults as in
the case of gold bars (Tindell, 2013, 5. March).
The Bitcoin Value Chain
As described in the previous section, the bitcoin creation pro-
cess differs from the issuance of fiat money, whose supply is
controlled and regulated by the central bank. In comparison,
in the Bitcoin ecosystem, the blockchain, which is based on
a P2P network of computers executing a determined algo-
rithm (the Bitcoin protocol), takes charge of this responsibil-
ity. This implies two core properties of Bitcoin: first, there
is no centralized regulatory instance that is responsible for
these tasks, and, second, the supply of money is limited to 21
million bitcoins because of one (of many) requirements de-
termined by the Bitcoin protocol (Bhaskar and Chuen, 2015,
p. 53). Additionally, the mining process is defined through a
predictable progressive growth rate, which will converge to-
ward zero until the year 2140. Hence, the issuance as well as
the mining rewards will be halved approx. every four years
which is equivalent to every 210,000 blocks mined (Bhaskar
and Chuen, 2015, p. 53).
In 2009, the first bitcoin was mined and as of January 20,
2018, approx. 16.8 million bitcoins have been issued, which
is roughly 80% of all the potentially available bitcoins (Coin-
desk, 2018, 20. January). When the newly emerged bitcoins
are mined, they are first added to the blockchain and, sub-
sequently, attributed to the successful miner(s). A miner has
two options: on the one hand, he has the possibility to sell the
bitcoins against fiat currencies or other cryptocurrencies on a
specific cryptocurrency exchange platform like bitfinex.com
or bittrex.com. On the other hand, the rewarded bitcoins can
be transferred directly to his wallet and can thus be used for
personal purposes, e.g., as a medium of exchange for real
or digital goods and services or as an investment (de Jong,
2015, pp. 416-417). An overview of the Bitcoin value chain
can be found in Figure 3.
In order to use and store bitcoins, regardless of how the
bitcoins are received – as a mining reward or bought on an ex-
change platform – one has to download a so-called "wallet."
A wallet is an application, typically for smartphones, tablets,
or desktop computers, through which an owner of bitcoins is
able to store, send and receive Bitcoin funds (Bitcoin Foun-
dation, 2017). Moreover, a wallet runs a key generation
software that creates a public address (known as a wallet
address) and stores the corresponding private key (Franco,
2014, p. 56). In this context, wallets are often described
as "containers for private keys," because the bitcoins them-
selves are stored on the blockchain and not in the user’s wal-
let, i.e., a wallet keeps only the corresponding private key to
sign a transaction and transfer the property rights of a bit-
coin (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 86). More information about
the transaction process is given in Section 2.1.3.2. A wallet
application also enables the conversion of public addresses to
QR codes, the management of incoming and outgoing pay-
ments, and displays the currently available funds (Sixt, 2017,
p. 37). A screenshot of a wallet can be seen in Figure 4.
As described, Bitcoin payments can be sent or received
by means of a wallet application. Therefore, the sender has
to type in the public address (or scan the QR code) of the
recipient and specify the number of bitcoins that should be
debited from the account.
In order to simplify the implementation of Bitcoin ac-
ceptance, to overcome the general complexity of the tech-
nological novice, and the "bottlenecks in exchanging" into
fiat currencies, merchants often use a payment processor (Pa-
padopoulos, 2015, p. 161). This is a company that serves as a
third-party provider and offers services for retailers to handle
their payments by providing a technical infrastructure such
as payment terminals, mobile apps, or e-commerce plugins.
These tools are commonly able to quote prices in the national
currency, directly convert bitcoins into the national currency,
and instantly confirm the transactions and thus ensure that
there is no risk of a payment default. All of this is done in
exchange for a transaction fee amounting to 0.5-1% of the
invoiced amount. This is cheaper than using credit cards
whose fees are 2-3% per transaction. (Cusumano, 2014, p.
23; Franco, 2014, p. 43)
At the end of the Bitcoin value chain, there are the sev-
eral applications of Bitcoin, which are mainly based in the
payment and investment industry, for instance, making pur-
chases, holding it as an investment asset, or making further
investments in other currencies or decentralized autonomous
organizations (DAOs). Due to the increasing acceptance but
continued lack of know-how about the complicated proce-
dures behind the entire value chain, Bitcoin-interested par-
ties are also able to instantly exchange their (fiat) money in
bitcoins more conveniently by way of a Bitcoin teller machine
(BTM). They can then later transfer them to their wallet and
are thus finally able to participate in the Bitcoin application
universe (Cohen, 2014, pp. 18-19).
Merchant Acceptance & Market Capitalization
At the time of writing this thesis, there are more than 1500
established cryptocurrencies (cf. Worldcoinindex, 2018, 9.
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February). According to Elfriede Sixt (2017, pp. 111f.), the
alternatives to Bitcoin are called "altcoins," which differ in
several ways, but primarily in terms of the underlying techno-
logical structure (blockchain and protocol), which influences
the validation process, the money supply, and the purpose of
the digital token issued (currency, smart contract, investment
token, usage token, utility token, etc.).
In the recent years, an increasing number of merchants
have started to accept Bitcoin payments. The payment pro-
cessor Coinbase’s advertisements state that "over 48,000 mer-
chants" use its technical infrastructure to accept Bitcoin pay-
ments. This includes multinational companies from several
industries, such as the online retailer overstock.com, the IT
company Dell, and the online travel company Expedia (Coin-
base, 2018, 12. February). Moreover, there are at least ten
payment processors, apart from companies that do not use
any payment processor. Unfortunately, there is no global
unambiguous number of merchants who actually accept Bit-
coin payments. For instance, the platform coinmap.org (op-
tional registration platform for Bitcoin merchants) lists ap-
prox. 11,400 merchants who accept Bitcoin payments as on
January 5, 2018 (Coinmap, 2018, 5. January).
In fact, as of January 20, 2018, Bitcoin had a total mar-
ket cap of USD 214.2 bn., which is equivalent to 34.8% of
the entire crypto market cap. Further, about 315,000 Bitcoin
transactions had been conducted in the previous 24 hours
(Blockchain, 2018, 20. January; Coinmarketcap, 2018, 4.
February) – six times more than four years ago. Moreover,
one bitcoin has a value of around USD 12,600 (Coinmar-
ketcap, 2018, 4. February), which has increased by approx.
1400% during the last year.
2.1.3. Blockchain
In recent times, blockchain technology has attracted more
and more industries. The application of the technology goes
far beyond the scope of cryptocurrencies. Massimo Di Pierro
(2017, p. 92), professor at the School of Computing of De-
Paul University, states that the problems of authentication,
integrity, and non-repudiation are solved by this disruptive
technology because it deals with the "problem of creating
a distributed storage of timestamped documents where no
party can tamper with the content of the data or the times-
tamps without detection."
The decentralized database system enables the emer-
gence of new use cases due to its ability to assign things to
identities in a tamper-proof and decentralized manner, such
as a decentralized notary, e.g., the attribution of physical
goods like real estate, gold, or diamonds to digital identities
(Deloitte, 2016, p. 5). Particularly, in the world of intellec-
tual property, the double-spending issue represents a huge
problem because of the "copy and paste" possibilities. Based
on the fact that there is no database documenting the pur-
chase/sale of a digital token (such as a song, for example),
the token can be shared in an unlimited manner (Vigna and
Casey, 2016, p. 120).
This vulnerability of double-spending can be eliminated
by means of the decentralized consensus process of the Bit-
coin blockchain (Underwood, 2016, p. 15). In general, "a
double-spend attempt occurs when a user tries to spend some
funds twice," which plays especially a significant role in the
financial system because all financial institutions must reject
these attempts (Franco, 2014, p. 6). In a centralized sys-
tem, this "is relatively straightforward [. . . ] because trans-
actions are recorded in a central database and future spend-
ing attempts are checked against this database first" (Franco,
2014, p. 6). Controversially, in a "decentralized system,
many copies of the database are shared among the peers,
and keeping a consistent state of the database is a difficult
computational problem" (Franco, 2014, p. 6).
According to Antonopoulos (2015, p. 3), the Bitcoin net-
work exhibits, by means of its underlying technology (the
blockchain), four key innovations functioning in a "unique
and powerful combination":
• A decentralized mathematical and deterministic cur-
rency issuance (Mining)
• A decentralized P2P network
• A decentralized transaction verification system
• A public transaction ledger
In order to explain these innovations, this chapter is divided
into three subsections: Structure, Transactions Process, and
the Decentralized Consensus of a Transaction (Mining).
Structure
The blockchain is the underlying technology that operates
a cryptocurrency and thus represents the fundamental pre-
requisite for its existence. Cryptocurrency experts like Vigna
and Casey (2016, p. 120) describe the Bitcoin blockchain
as "bitcoin’s central nervous system." Some confusion might
arise from the fact that the term Bitcoin is used for all three
layers in the technology stack of the Bitcoin blockchain, i.e.,
"Bitcoin" refers to the blockchain, its protocol, as well as the
available currency and tokens issued (Franco, 2014, pp. 18-
19). However, Figure 5 presents a general link between these
three layers.
The Bitcoin blockchain is essentially a database that is
represented by its nodes and "replicated as many times as
there are nodes" (Morettini, n.D.). These nodes provide their
central processing unit (CPU) to the Bitcoin network to run a
software known as the Bitcoin protocol. This is why Moret-
tini (n.D.) states that the Bitcoin blockchain can even be de-
scribed as a "supercomputer formed by the combination of
the CPUs [. . . ] of all its nodes." In this context, it is important
to understand that the Bitcoin blockchain is not a tool for the
transmission of bitcoins; it is rather "an authoritative public
record that records the chain of title for any current bitcoin
holdings" (Lloyds, 2015, p. 7). This implies that from a tech-
nical point of view, a blockchain is a database allowing data
collection in the form of data packages which can be easily
accessed, updated, and managed (Rouse, 2017).
From an application-oriented, comparable, and conceiv-
able view, the Bitcoin blockchain is often considered as a
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Figure 5: Layers in the Bitcoin Blockchain Technology Stack; Source: Own illustration according to Swan (2015, p. 1)
"general ledger," because each transaction that has ever been
conducted since January 3, 2009, is recorded in this publicly
accessible and non-reversible transaction ledger (Sixt, 2017,
p. 30; Franco, 2014, p. 95). In general, a blockchain can be
compared with an endless table containing three columns:
the transaction’s timestamp, the transaction’s details, and the
corresponding hash (Di Pierro, 2017, p. 93).
The Bitcoin protocol, which is executed by the nodes,
takes charge of the proof and verification process of trans-
actions determined in a decentralized consensus process (Vi-
gna and Casey, 2016, p. 124). The underlying software al-
gorithm (the Bitcoin protocol) determines the steps that any
node has to execute in order to accomplish a general consen-
sus for a transaction, i.e., either to validate and confirm or
to deny a transaction (Sixt, 2017, pp. 1-2). Additionally, the
protocol defines the properties of cryptocurrency, such as the
(limited) amount of coins issued or the explicit details (halv-
ing time, coins per block, etc.) about the (deterministic) coin
issuance. In general, it can be stated that the Bitcoin protocol
sets the rules and the framework conditions for a cryptocur-
rency.
Thus the existence of a cryptocurrency token (such as
one bitcoin) can be attributed to a database (the blockchain),
which operates the appropriate software (the protocol). Each
cryptocurrency consists of at least these three layers (Swan,
2015, p. 1).
Transaction Process
The transaction process can be generally divided into two
steps: the authorization process by means of digital signa-
tures and a decentralized verification and validation process
(mining).
A bitcoin is a unique number that results as the solution
of a cryptographic puzzle (Di Pierro, 2017, p. 93). Thus,
a transaction is the change of ownership of this number,
which in turn requires the authorization of possessing and
transferring this number, i.e., a single bitcoin or its fractions
(Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 18). However, the question is how
a transaction works and, in turn, how the ownership of a bit-
coin changes. Bitcoin’s inventor Satoshi Nakamoto (2008,
p. 2) defined an electronic coin as "a chain of digital signa-
tures." Hence, a transfer of the ownership and control of a
coin is achieved "by digitally signing a hash of the previous
transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding
these to the end of the coin" (Nguyen, 2017, p. 1). In this
context, the blockchain stores this chain of digital signatures
(Lloyds, 2015, p. 7).
This sounds extremely complicated at first glance, but it
can be simplified in the following way: In the Bitcoin net-
work, the transfer of bitcoins is authorized and initiated by
digitally signing a transaction. This digital signature process
is based on a public-private key pair, which is based on its
cryptographic origin, or, to be more specific, to the calcula-
tion of elliptic curves that are based on the Elliptic Curve Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) (Sixt, 2017, p. 37). Nev-
ertheless, although the public key can be compared with a
bank account number, the private key serves as the signature
unlocking this bank account (Franco, 2014, p. 56). The pos-
session and control of a bitcoin (or its fractions) is the same
as having knowledge about the private key that is mathemat-
ically linked to the public address/key (Lloyds, 2015, p. 7).
For instance, let’s say a signer called Alice would like to
buy a coffee at Bob’s café (the recipient). To begin, Alice
needs a public-private key pair that is usually automatically
generated by her Bitcoin wallet. She then sends her public
key to the recipient (2). In the meantime (3), she uses her
private key to digitally sign the transaction terms (called a
"message" in Figure 6) containing the transaction details (i.e.,
price and terms) along with a timestamp (Di Pierro, 2017, p.
93; Goldman Sachs, 2016, pp. 8f.). When the transaction
is transmitted (4) to Bob, he is able to verify it using Alice’s
public key (5). If the verification goes through, he knows that
Alice has triggered the payment and that she has transferred
her ownership rights of the bitcoins to him (6). An overview
of this digital signature process can be seen in Figure 6 above.
In practice, these "technical" steps are not conducted by Alice
or Bob but by their wallet applications, which are linked to
the Bitcoin protocol. Finally, the signatures are proofed and
verified by the nodes of the Bitcoin blockchain (Franco, 2014,
pp. 56-57).
To sum up, a digital signature serves two purposes: "(1)
to verify the transaction to be sent and validated to the Bit-
coin network, and also (2) to confirm her assent to the trans-
action" (Nguyen, 2017, p. 2). When a transaction is signed,
the verification and validation process begins by generating
a computational hash, which is conducted by a decentralized
network of miners in a process known as the "mining pro-
cess", cf. Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Digital Signature Process; Source: Franco (2014, p. 57)
The Decentralized Consensus of Transaction (Mining)
This mining process is conducted by all network nodes
or "miners," who are essentially electronic bookkeepers. In
general, Bitcoin transactions are similar to the entries in a
double-entry bookkeeping ledger (see Figure 8). On one
side, there are the credits on a Bitcoin account (the inputs) re-
sulting from one or more incoming Bitcoin payments or min-
ing earnings. On the other side of the ledger are the debits
(the outputs) that equal to the Bitcoin payments made. In
this context, the inputs need not to be equal to the outputs,
with the difference being the transaction fees for the miners.
(Antonopoulos, 2015, pp. 18-19)
When a transaction is signed, it is first shared among the
network nodes (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 25). In order to
review and validate the transaction, the miners include all
transactions (since the last mined block) to the next block of
the blockchain, which has to be subsequently mined. Now
the mining process begins: Mining is based on a crypto-
graphic concept where nonces are randomly guessed, until
the right one is found – the so-called "proof-of-work" (Sixt,
2017, p. 40). The nonce is a random number used for the
verification of a unique hash calculated using cryptographic
means (Nofer et al., 2017, pp. 183-184).
From a more comprehensive view, Bitcoin mining can be
described as a competitive Sudoku "that resets every time
someone finds a solution and whose difficulty automatically
adjusts so that it takes approx. ten minutes to find a solu-
tion" (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 26). The successful miner who
solves the Sudoku (or the algorithm) and finds the proof-of-
work, shares this solution with the other network nodes. The
other miners verify the result and, subsequently, propagate
the new block in the network (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 26).
If this new block is validated, it will be "sealed" and
recorded in the blockchain while the miners go on to solve
the algorithm of the next block (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 27).
Furthermore, the timestamp and the nonce are added to the
mined block and thus a blockchain can be compared with
a table containing three columns: the transaction’s times-
tamp, the transaction’s details, and the corresponding hash
(Di Pierro, 2017, p. 93). In order to make this database
tamper-proof, the hash of the previous block is included as
well. Therefore, it is not possible to change any transactions
that have already been conducted, verified and confirmed
without changing the entire blockchain, because any change
would immediately affect the hash values calculated (Nofer
et al., 2017, pp. 183-184). This implies that no one can
counterfeit the blockchain without the network noticing it,
because each peer keeps a copy of the entire common as-
set ledger (Franco, 2014, p. 8; Morettini, n.D.). Figure 9
provides an overview of an example of a blockchain.
Referring again to our previous example, Alice gets her
first payment confirmation after the block containing her
transaction is sealed. If the next block is mined, Alice will
get her second confirmation and so on. This implies that each
block mined on top of the block containing the initial trans-
action represents an implicit confirmation and thus it will
be exponentially harder to reverse or manipulate a trans-
action. Usually, a block with more than six confirmations
is considered as "irrevocable" because it would cost an ex-
tremely large amount of computational power to recalculate
six blocks (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 28).
As already described, the miners provide their computers’
power (CPUs) to the Bitcoin network in order to execute the
Bitcoin protocol, which determines the steps a computer has
to execute to validate or deny a transaction to the blockchain
(Böhme et al., 2015, p. 215; de Jong, 2015, p. 417). In ex-
change for providing their processing power, the miners get
paid for their "work" through incentives or "mining rewards,"
which is in the form of newly issued bitcoins (Gisler, 2015,
pp. 13-14). Every ten minutes, new bitcoins are issued due to
the period of the validation process (Vigna and Casey, 2016,
p. 132). See Figure 10 that outlines this entire process.
The new issuance of bitcoins therefore occurs six times
per hour and 144 times per day, or, in other words, 144
blocks are mined per day. Due to the fact that the mining
rewards are halved every four years, cryptocurrency experts
like Antonopoulos (2015, p. 3) speak about a "deterministic
currency issuance" in case of Bitcoin. Currently, there are ap-
prox. 500,000 mined blocks and the mining reward per block
is about 12.5 bitcoins (Blockchain, 2018, 20. January).
In summary, it can be stated that the mining process ful-
fills two interrelated core tasks: on the one hand, the is-
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Figure 7: Transaction Process; Source: Goldman Sachs (2016, p. 8)
Figure 8: Transaction as Doubly-Entry Bookkeeping; Source: Antonopoulos (2015, p. 19)
Figure 9: Example of a Blockchain; Source: Nofer et al. (2017, p. 184)
suance of new bitcoins, which is quite similar to a central
bank printing new money, and, on the other hand, the valida-
tion of transactions, which is its main purpose (Antonopou-
los, 2015, pp. 25; 175-176). An overview of the entire min-
ing process can be found in Appendix 1 – The Mining Process.
2.1.4. Regulation
Notwithstanding, Bitcoin has gained popularity no just
as a form of currency in the context of e-commerce. Partic-
ularly in consideration of regulatory issues, cryptocurrencies
have in the meantime caught the attention of countries and
communities of states as well. The increasing market capi-
talization and discussions about the classification of virtual
currencies have fostered the consideration of virtual curren-
cies as a subject of regulation; for instance, in April 2017,
Japan announced that it officially recognizes Bitcoin as a le-
gal tender (Gautham, 2017). In comparison, there are also
countries such as Bolivia, Vietnam, and Bangladesh that have
completely banned Bitcoin and declared cryptocurrencies as
illegal (Swan, 2015, p. 7).
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Figure 10: The Bitcoin Mining; Source: http://en.bitcoinwiki.org/Mining
In 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB, 2012, p. 13)
classified Bitcoin as a virtual currency with the following def-
inition: "A virtual currency is a type of unregulated, digi-
tal money, which is issued and usually controlled by its de-
velopers, and used and accepted among the members of a
specific virtual community." Until now, Bitcoin is still not
specifically regulated in the European Union (EU) including
Switzerland (Piller, 2017, p. 9); however, in recent weeks,
there have been many proposals to consider virtual curren-
cies at least in the national regulations around Anti-Money-
Laundering (AML) and Know-Your-Customer (KYC) issues
(Kollewe, 2017, 4. December). This is perhaps mainly due
to the significant price development (cf. Appendix 2) and
the remarkable market capitalization during the last year.
Therefore, a greater number of voices are now demanding
a stronger regulation of Bitcoin, especially in consideration
of money laundering issues (Berschens et al., 2017, 19. De-
cember; Kollewe, 2017, 4. December).
2.2. Enterprise Risk Management & Internal Control
2.2.1. Definitions & Relevance
Risks are dynamic, fluid, and extremely interdependent
(Lam, 2014, p. 51). In today’s highly volatile and dynamic
environment, a company requires an integrative approach to
manage its risk portfolio instead of single detective controls
that are implemented and monitored by separate business
units (Lam, 2014, p. 51). For instance, the implementation
of a new payment method, such as the acceptance of cryp-
tocurrencies, does not solely influence the accounting and
controlling department as an additional payment option that
has to be considered in the revenue recognition and con-
solidation. There might even be some fundamental adap-
tions due to emerging risks in the underlying IT infrastruc-
ture/security, operational dealings, as well as the compliance
of new regulations by accepting these payments. Therefore,
an integrative approach across several business units is re-
quired.
The ERM function takes charge of this responsibility by
establishing "firm-wide policies and standards, [coordinat-
ing] risk management activities across business units and
functions, and [providing] overall risk monitoring for senior
management and the board" (Lam, 2014, p. 51). The ob-
jective of ERM is to ensure that the company’s management
is able to effectively deal with uncertainty and its associated
risks. In order to achieve this, the approach aims at ensuring
the effective running of business operations, accurate report-
ing and compliance with regulations to prevent any events
that might damage the company’s reputation (COSO, 2004,
p. 1).
The concept of internal control (IC) is an integral part
of an entity’s risk management. In general, IC is defined as
"a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors (BoD),
management, and other personnel, designed to provide rea-
sonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives
relating to operations, reporting, and compliance" (COSO,
2013, p. 3). This implies that IC does not only describe the
detective and the corrective controls associated, it also pro-
poses an integrative approach including directive and pre-
ventive controls to ensure that no misconduct or adverse
event can occur that might negatively affect the company’s
objectives (Ruud and Jenal, 2005, p. 456).
For this purpose, the implementation of the COSO IC
Framework provides a proper method of solution, established
by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Tread-
way Commission (COSO). This risk management framework
outlines components, principles, and factors that are neces-
sary to effectively manage risks (COSO, 2015, p. 1). How-
ever, "although risk management frameworks can effectively
identify the types of risks that modern businesses must con-
trol, these frameworks are largely silent about how specific
duties should be assigned and coordinated within the orga-
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nization" (of Internal Auditors , IIA, p. 1). Therefore, the
proper assignment of duties and responsibilities related to IC
within an organization’s governance is a prerequisite. In this
context, the Three Lines of Defense (TLoD) model provides a
simple and systematic approach to improve the effectiveness
of a company’s risk management (of Internal Auditors , IIA,
p. 2).
2.2.2. Internal Control
In an Organization’s Governance
By describing IC’s responsibilities and further differentiating
it from the internal audit function within a corporation, the
TLoD model, established by the European Confederation of
Institutes of Internal Auditing (IIA) and the Federation of Eu-
ropean Risk Management Associations, is being increasingly
used and generally accepted as an institutional framework
(Casari, 2017, p. 17; Hunziker, 2015, p. 52). This frame-
work is employed to address "how specific duties related to
risk and control could be assigned and coordinated within an
organization" with the objective of increasing the likelihood
of achieving the company’s objectives (COSO, 2015, p. 1). It
can be seen as a set of guidelines for how risk and control du-
ties must be allocated and executed within an organizational
structure. Moreover, such effective coordination of responsi-
bilities prevents a duplication of efforts and controls, which
in turn fosters a more effective risk management approach
(of Internal Auditors , IIA, p. 1).
The TLoD model is based on the assumption that "three
lines" within an organization are necessary for the effective
management of risk and control (cf. Figure 11):
• 1st Line of Defense: Operating management that is re-
sponsible for owning and managing risk and control
• 2nd Line of Defense: Management support that takes
care of monitoring the risk and control
• 3rd Line of Defense: Independent assurance concern-
ing the management of risk and control
As can be seen in Figure 11, the senior management and the
BoD as well as external parties such as the external auditors
or regulators play integral roles (Hunziker, 2015, pp. 52-53).
Whereas the senior management is responsible for selecting,
developing, and evaluating the IC system, the BoD will man-
age and overview the entire process (COSO, 2015, p. 4).
Both groups are primary stakeholders, served by the three
lines. It is their "responsibility and accountability for setting
the organization’s objectives, defining strategies to achieve
those objectives, and establishing governance structures and
processes to best manage the risks in accomplishing those ob-
jectives" (of Internal Auditors , IIA, p. 3). Additionally, they
are in the best position to help ensure and actively support
the implementation of the TLoD (of Internal Auditors , IIA,
pp. 2-3).
External auditors, regulators, and other external parties
are outside the organization’s structure. Even still, they are
able to influence the organization’s government and control
structure, e.g., by setting requirements to strengthen the con-
trol or by performing independent assessments. This implies
that an external body can become an additional line of de-
fense by "providing assurance to the organization’s share-
holders, including the governing body and senior manage-
ment." (of Internal Auditors , IIA, p. 6)
To sum up, the TLoD framework can be described as a
prerequisite but also as a complimentary framework to the
COSO IC Framework in order to assign and allocate duties
within an organization and to thus ensure proper risk man-
agement.
COSO Internal Control – Integrated Framework
In 1992, the COSO issued a report presenting the first COSO
IC Framework (Arwinge, 2012, p. 37). In general, the US-
based organization is dedicated to improving a companies’
financial reporting quality, IC and Corporate Governance (Ar-
winge, 2012, p. 37). Over time, the COSO has developed and
further modified several frameworks that concretize ERM
and IC (Graham, 2015, p. 2). These frameworks outline
components, principles, and factors that are necessary to ef-
fectively manage risks. Moreover, they provide evaluation
tools for an organization to assess its IC (COSO, 2015, p. 1;
Graham, 2015, p. 2) and therefore represents a worthwhile
tool for "directors, managers, auditors, regulators, investors
and other concerned stakeholders" (Arwinge, 2012, p. 37).
In the literature on this subject, there is some confusion
about the COSO IC and the COSO ERM Frameworks, be-
cause the COSO has also published a COSO ERM Frame-
work in 2004. This framework explicitly addresses control
mechanisms for the achievement of strategic goals, which
thus additionally provide "a more robust and extensive fo-
cus on the broader subject of enterprise risk management"
(COSO, 2004, p. 5; Hunziker, 2015, p. 36). This implies
that the ERM framework intends to expand the initial COSO
IC Framework and to establish a more comprehensive frame-
work. However, Buber and Holzmüller (2009, p. 106) states
that the ERM and IC Frameworks are almost identical. This
statement can be further justified by the fact that the COSO
ERM Framework already encompasses the COSO IC Frame-
work. According to the COSO (2013, p. ii) itself, both frame-
works are "intended to be complimentary" and they do not
supersede each other. For the further analysis, the author
focuses on the COSO 2013 IC Framework, shown in Figure
12.
The COSO IC Framework enables "organizations to effec-
tively and efficiently develop and maintain systems of inter-
nal control that can enhance the likelihood of achieving the
entity’s objectives and adapt to changes in the business and
operating environments" (COSO, 2013, p. i).
In order to achieve this, the COSO IC Framework com-
prises three divisions (see Figure 12): objectives (the three
columns), components (the five rows), and organizational
structure (the third division). The first and second division
are directly related to each other because the entity’s objec-
tives – which can be divided into operational, reporting, and
compliance categories – require all five components for their
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Figure 11: The Three Lines of Defense; Source: COSO (2015, p. 2)
Figure 12: COSO 2013 Internal Control - Integrated Framework; Source: COSO (2013, p. 6)
success. Moreover, IC is relevant to the entire organization
(third division), i.e., from the group level to each division,
including any business unit and function. (Bungartz, 2017,
p. 20; COSO, 2013, p. 6)
The five interrelated key components of IC are: control
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information
& communication and, monitoring activities (Arwinge, 2012,
p. 37; Graham, 2015, p. 2). In a brief summary, they can be
described in the following way:
• Control Environment: The control environment de-
fines the basics of the IC within an organization. In
this first stage, the "tone at the top" of a company
is set when the responsibilities of the BoD and the
senior management are negotiated and determined.
This has a considerable impact on the working atmo-
sphere within the company, the daily business opera-
tions, but also on the handling of risks (Ruud et al.,
2008, p. 939). In consideration of factors such as in-
tegrity and ethical values and organizational structure
and management philosophy, the control environment
compromises the establishment of a "sound control en-
vironment." This sets the context standards for ethical
behavior, corporate culture, and the basis for execut-
ing IC across an organization, including the expected
standards of conduct (Arwinge, 2012, p. 43).
• Risk Assessment: When the company’s objectives and
its corresponding control environment are defined, the
risks that might negatively affect these can be identi-
fied by means of a risk assessment (Ruud et al., 2008,
p. 940). Generally, emerging risks can be from internal
or external sources. In this context, the risk assessment
represents a dynamic and iterative process that evalu-
ates the risks identified according to their likelihood
and potential damage (COSO, 2013, p. 4). This pro-
cess plays an increasingly important role in today’s dy-
namic and fast paced environment and finally provides
the basis for decisions concerning how and which risks
have to be managed (Bungartz, 2017, p. 39).
• Control Activities: Based on the risk assessment per-
formed, the management decides which control mea-
sures (preventive, directive, detective, or corrective)
have to be implemented to properly address the risks
identified (Hunziker, 2015, p. 32; Pfaff and Ruud,
2013, pp. 73-74). For this decision process, the de-
velopment of a risk control matrix can be quite useful.
According to Pfaff and Ruud (2013, p. 85), a risk con-
trol matrix can be employed as tool in order to deal
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with, present, and document the risks identified. Table
2 presents a simplified version of a risk control matrix.
Depending on the organization’s size, the matrix could
be more sophisticated to give a more comprehensive
understanding of the risks. However, a risk control ma-
trix also enables greater transparency for all involved
parties, ranging from employees to external auditors,
which improves risk awareness and the appropriate
development and adaption of internal controls (Pfaff
and Ruud, 2013, p. 86). These implemented con-
trol measures may include a range of manual activities
like the review of necessary documents as well as au-
tomated controls such as software-based journal entry
testing. In general, control activities are actions estab-
lished through policies and procedures "that help en-
sure that management’s directives to mitigate risks to
the achievement of objectives are carried out" (COSO,
2013, p. 4). These control activities may be located
and further performed throughout the entire organiza-
tion, i.e., at all levels of the entity and in all business
processes (Arwinge, 2012, p. 46).
• Information & Communication: Information obtained
from internal or external sources serves as the basis for
the communication of internal responsibilities (COSO,
2013, p. 5). In order to ensure that the control ac-
tivities determined are implemented and effective, the
necessary and important information needs to first be
identified. Afterwards, this information should be com-
municated in a comprehensive way, so that it builds the
basis for every employee’s actions with regard to man-
agement and IC in the company (Ruud et al., 2008, p.
940). This implies that information and communica-
tion are highly dependent and, moreover, are critical
to help achieve a company’s objectives (Casari, 2017,
p. 23).
• Monitoring Activities: Finally, a company has to assess
and ensure the quality of the internal controls imple-
mented over time (Graham, 2015, p. 173), especially
given that a company’s internal controls have to be
continuously adjusted to external and internal changes
(Ruud et al., 2008, p. 940). Therefore, the implemen-
tation process and the effectiveness of the internal con-
trols require the appropriate monitoring activities to
ensure their presence and functioning. These activities
may be performed in the form of ongoing evaluations,
separate evaluations, or a combination of both (COSO,
2013, p. 5).
In addition to the framework proposed, the COSO has
stipulated 17 principles (cf. Appendix 3) aimed at formal-
izing the above-mentioned concepts "in a more comprehen-
sive manner" (Caserni, 2017, p. 23). These principles have
been directly derived from the five key components, and, ac-
cording to COSO (2013, p. 6), effective IC can be achieved
through their implementation and application.
A Regulatory Perspective
The COSO IC Framework represents a key conceptual and
practical framework for several groups of stakeholders (Ar-
winge, 2012, p. 39). Specifically in relation to the emerg-
ing issues around Corporate Governance, the framework be-
comes increasingly important because it serves the funda-
mental principles (Hunziker, 2015, p. 34). Even though
there is no obligation to design and implement IC within an
organization, there is certainly a tendency toward stronger
regulations (Ruud and Jenal, 2005, p. 455). According to
Hunziker (2015, p. 39), this phenomenon is an implication
of the negative developments of economies and the several
corporate scandals in recent times, such as the Enron or the
Dotcom scandal.
The US can be cited as a model example in the context
of more stringent regulations. Following the implementation
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, an organization’s
management is responsible for IC and has to make a state-
ment with regard to the appropriateness of internal control
over financial reporting (ICOFR) (Ruud and Jenal, 2005, p.
455). Additionally, SOX Section 404 prescribes that the fi-
nancial statement auditor "must assess and report on both
management’s assessment of the ICOFR and the operating ef-
fectiveness on the ICOFR" (Arwinge, 2012, p. 65). The SOX
regulation applies to all companies, including foreign sub-
sidiaries, which are listed by the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (Caserni, 2017, p. 27; Westerhausen, 2005, pp.
100-101). Therefore, IC represents an integral part of the
US’ mandatory law and, moreover, needs attestation by an
auditor.
In order to improve the Corporate Governance in the EU,
its commission also adopted similar guidelines in 2006. The
new guidelines bear some similarities to the SOX and aim
at harmonizing the regulation of IC across Europe. How-
ever, because there are no further European regulations, the
respective national laws are applicable (Hunziker, 2015, p.
43). For instance, in Switzerland, the Swiss Code of Obli-
gations (CO) further specifies the role of IC. According to
art. 728a, paragraph 1 cipher 3 CO & art. 727, paragraph 1
CO, the external auditor has the duty of examining whether
"there is an internal system of control," with all public com-
panies as well as any economically significant company be-
ing subject bound by these regulations (Ruud et al., 2008, p.
938). Moreover, the CO states that the BoD has the "non-
transferable and inalienable duties" of the company’s man-
agement and organization, which inter alia includes the or-
ganization "of the accounting, financial control and financial
planning systems as required for management of the com-
pany" (art. 716a, paragraph 1 ciphers 1–3 CO). While the
CO only mentions the existence of IC, the Swiss Code of
Best Practice for Corporate Governance outlines further rec-
ommendations with regard to IC (Ruud and Jenal, 2005, p.
455). However, there are still no legally binding require-
ments only recommendations concerning IC design and im-
plementation in the EU.
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Table 2: Simplified Version of a Risk Control Matrix; Source: Own illustration according to Pfaff and Ruud (2013, p. 85)
Objectives Risks Control Activities
. . . . . . . . .
2.2.3. Failures and Limitations
Although the implementation of the COSO IC Framework
enhances the likelihood of achieving the entity’s objectives,
one has to keep in mind that IC gives only a reasonable and
not absolute assurance (Graham, 2015, p. 15). For instance,
a bad judgment made on the basis of a simple error or bias
or an external event might negatively affect an entity’s oper-
ational goals, which cannot be prevented by IC. To sum up,
even an effective IC can experience failure due to the follow-
ing reasons:
• Human error: If the people who have implemented and
executed IC make errors, which, in turn, lead to control
failures
• Management overrides: A manager is able to override
IC control for selfish purposes
• Collusion: The ability to circumvent IC by means of
secret agreements (COSO, 2013, p. 9, Graham, 2015,
pp. 15-16; Ruud and Jenal, 2005, p. 456)
Hence, an organization’s management should be aware of
these vulnerabilities "when selecting, developing, and de-
ploying controls that minimize, to the extent practical, these
limitations" (COSO, 2013, p. 9).
3. Methodology: Approach
3.1. Research Concept
According to Brace (2013, p. 6) the definition of the re-
search objective represents the first step of an empirical anal-
ysis. The ultimate aim of this study is the development of an
appropriate framework and providing a set of recommenda-
tions to ensure the proper operational handling of cryptocur-
rencies. Therefore, the study identifies the following three
research questions (cf. Chapter 1.1):
• What are the potential risks and resulting threats of
accepting cryptocurrencies as a payment method?
• Are the companies and the responsible employees
aware of these risks, and how do they evaluate and
address them?
• Are there any general control activities and recommen-
dations necessary to ensure an appropriate risk man-
agement in the handling of cryptocurrencies?
In order to answer these questions, a research concept was
developed based on a combination of literature and empirical
analysis. Based on the literature review on cryptocurrencies
(cf. 2.1) and ERM (cf. 2.2), the author derived and identi-
fied the potential risks of Bitcoin payments and divided them
into operational, reporting, and compliance risks in Chapter
4.1. The risk identification approach follows the COSO IC
Framework (cf. 2.2.2.2), wherein the subsequent empirical
analysis focuses on the stage of the risk assessment and the
corresponding control activities of the COSO IC Framework.
The results obtained of the risk identification provide, on the
one hand, the answer to the first research question and, on
the other hand, the basis for the empirical analysis that fol-
lows.
In the second part of the research concept, the empirical
analysis (cf. 4.2) is conducted starting with an analysis of the
general payment process. This is important to understand if
there is any third-party intermediary (i.e., a payment proces-
sor) involved that already covers any risks and, moreover,
to comprehend how the company deals with the incoming
funds. Afterwards, the explicit administration of Bitcoin pay-
ments in a company will be addressed, which focuses on pri-
vate key storage and its corresponding responsibilities. Fur-
ther, the survey participants were tasked with conducting an
assessment of the potential risks that were previously iden-
tified with regard to Bitcoin payments. Their responses will
help answer the research question of to what extent compa-
nies are aware of and how they evaluate risk potential and
severity. Finally, the current risk measures – provided that
there are internal controls implemented – will be analyzed.
In the third and last step, the paper outlines specific rec-
ommendations in the form of a risk control matrix, which
is based on a summary of the previous results (cf. 4.3.1).
Furthermore, the author presents a more general and holis-
tic approach, called the "Cryptocurrency IC Framework" (cf.
4.3.2) that was established following the COSO IC Frame-
work. The framework integrates the results of this thesis. By
combining the Cryptocurrency IC Framework and the devel-
oped risk control matrix, this thesis presents the recommen-
dations necessary in order to ensure the appropriate opera-
tional management of cryptocurrencies.
3.2. Research Method
A research method can be defined as a "system for col-
lecting information" that should be based on an "architecture
that serves a theme or multiple themes" in order to yield a
well-constructed data (Azzara, 2010, p. 16; Sue and Ritter,
2007, pp. 1-2). For the empirical analysis of this thesis, the
author decided to employ an online survey with integrated
display logics and redirection functions (see "survey" in Ap-
pendix 5). The survey required the participants to answer a
series of questions within a certain time frame, which is nec-
essary to ensure a considerable response rate and enhance
the representativeness of the sample (Azzara, 2010, p. 25).
There are, of course, many different ways to conduct a
survey, e.g., face-to-face interview, phone interview, written
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interview, or online interview (Blasius and Baur, 2014, p.
662). An online questionnaire is an appropriate research
tool in case of a fairly large sample that is geographically
distributed (Blasius and Baur, 2014, p. 662). Moreover, Sue
and Ritter (2007, pp. 13-14) state that the online option
is well suited to sensitive questions because of its anonymity,
and it prevents any bias in the responses through the absence
of an interviewer (Brace, 2013, pp. 23, 26).
The ultimate goal of a questionnaire "is to meet research
objectives by obtaining valid data from respondents who are
properly screened and qualified" (Azzara, 2010, pp. 18-19).
Therefore, a representative sample for the entire population
has to be identified (see Chapter 3.4). In addition to the se-
lection of a representative sample, the objectivity, reliability,
and validity concerning the research data plays a significant
role (Blasius and Baur, 2014, p. 72).
As described in the previous paragraph, objectivity can
be ensured by a large sample and an appropriate research
method, such as an online survey, in this case. Research valid-
ity and reliability can be improved by applying the concept of
triangulation (Flick, 2011, p. 16), which refers to "the com-
bination of methodologies in the study of the same phenom-
ena" (cit. in Flick, 2011, p. 13). Therefore, the questionnaire
for this thesis was designed to include qualitative and quan-
titative questions, which are intended to supplement each
other (Blasius and Baur, 2014, p. 42). Whereas the quali-
tative questions are used to describe, interpret, and compre-
hend interdependencies, the quantitative questions provide
numbers and values aimed at quantifying complex issues in
an objective manner (Buber and Holzmüller, 2009, p. 73).
3.3. Research Measurement
The author Ian Brace (2013) states that responses to
quantitative questions are generally measured using four
kinds of data types and associated scales:
• Nominal data, which can be classified "into discrete cat-
egories by name" (p. 48)
• Ordinal data, which represents ranking scales without
measuring the interval between each rank (p. 49)
• Interval data, which "provide[s] a rating for each item
on a scale that has a numerically equal distance be-
tween each point" (p. 51)
• Ratio data, which is a special type of interval scale be-
cause the zero point has real meaning (p. 53)
This study employs nominal scales, ordinal scales (e.g., in
the form of a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5), and interval
scales (e.g., a 10-point rating scale).
However, qualitative questions are assessed and evalu-
ated through the concept of inductive content analysis. In-
ductive content analysis is recommended when the level of
knowledge about a phenomenon is rather low or limited.
Therefore, an inductive approach is more appropriate for
studies intended to derive a theory from raw data rather than
to verify an existing theory (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008, p. 107).
The process of analysis of this method consists of three main
stages: preparation, organization, and reporting (cf. Figure
13). However, the main function of content analysis is to clas-
sify as many words as possible from a text and to summarize
the results in a proper model, conceptual map, or categories
(Elo and Kyngäs, 2008, p. 107).
3.4. Sample
Before a survey can be developed and distributed, a rep-
resentative sample has to be defined (Brace, 2013, p. 7). For
this empirical study, it was quite difficult to select a repre-
sentative sample because there is no transparent information
available on how many companies accept Bitcoin payments.
According to the merchant service provider Coinbase
(2018, 12. February), globally, over 48,000 merchants use
its payment processor service. In contrast, the Bitcoin ac-
ceptance map called "coinmap.org" displays 11,400 globally
registered venues at the time of writing this thesis (Coinmap,
2017, 21. September). A more specific source is btc-echo.de,
which gives information about 250 companies accepting Bit-
coin in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria and, moreover,
there are about 30 multinationals accepting Bitcoin payments
(BTC Echo, 2017).
In consideration of the aim of the research questions and
the general lack of research available on this topic, this em-
pirical analysis had no specific limitations – the only require-
ment was that the company had to be registered in Europe.
There were no limitations on any particular industry, ge-
ographical area, or source of Bitcoin-accepting companies
mentioned in the previous paragraph. This implies that this
thesis focuses on gathering as much information as possible
that can be justified by the research aim of developing a gen-
eral and holistic framework. Based on these assumptions,
the author created a random sample in the form of an Ex-
cel spreadsheet including the addresses and corresponding
contact person (if any).
The survey was sent to 346 companies/institutions reg-
istered in European countries, with the majority (77.72%)
being registered in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria. The
type of organization ranged from micro-businesses to large
corporations. The online survey was initially developed in
English and then translated into German. When applicable,
the cover letter was personalized, else the survey was sent
with a general cover note (cf. Appendix 4).
From November 22 to December 15, 2017, the online sur-
vey was fully completed by 65 companies, which is a response
rate of approx. 18.79%. An overview of the participants’ in-
dustries can be seen in Figure 14.
The majority of the survey participants belonged to the
retail industry (32.31%), the tourism sector (13.85%), and
IT (13.85%). Furthermore, a considerable number operated
in the areas of legal, tax, finance, or controlling services
(9.23%), other services (7.69%) and in the healthcare indus-
try (6.15%). The remaining quarter was represented by other
industries, with a more detailed listing shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 13: Inductive Content Analysis; Source: Own illustration according to Elo and Kyngäs (2008, p. 110)
Figure 14: Industry-wide Distribution of Survey Participants
The participating organizations mainly ranged from micro-
to small-businesses, with:
• 86.15% having up to 9 employees and up to€ 2 million
revenue/year (micro-business)
• 9.23% having up to 49 employees and up to € 10 mil-
lion revenue/year (small-business)
• 3.08% having up to 249 employees and up to€ 50 mil-
lion revenue/year (SME)
• 1.54% having more than 249 employees and over€ 50
million revenue/year (large corporation)
With regard to the share of Bitcoin payments (measured as
the percentage of total amount of incoming payments), the
vast majority (78.46%) indicated that less than 1% of incom-
ing funds are currently paid in bitcoins. However, 18.46% of
the participants stated that their share of Bitcoin payments is
1-5% while 3.08% stated the percentage is 5-20%.
4. Methodology: Results
4.1. Risk Identification of Bitcoin
According to Arwinge (2012, p. 45) and the COSO IC
Framework (Section 2.2.2.2), risks can be classified into the
following three categories:
• Operational risks related to the effective and efficient
use of resources
• Reporting risks that might affect financial reporting
quality
• Compliance risks representing any breaches of applica-
ble laws and regulations
The identification of risks serves as the basis of empirical risk
assessment and, thus, helps answer the research question re-
lated to how risks should be evaluated, managed, and con-
trolled by an organization. Therefore, the author has iden-
tified and summarized the risks of Bitcoin that might neg-
atively affect an entity’s operational, reporting and compli-
ance objectives in order to answer the first research question
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and, moreover, to provide the basis for the empirical analysis
in Chapter 4.2. Additionally, the potential implications (PI)
and potential control activities (PCA) are outlined at the end
of each sub-section in the form of a table.
• What are the potential risks and resulting threats of
accepting cryptocurrencies as a payment method?
4.1.1. Operational Risks
A lack of know-how
Cryptocurrencies have emerged with the completely new in-
vention of blockchain technology. Due to the properties of
this technology and the way in which it is used to conduct
transactions, there are considerable differences in how pay-
ments are dealt with compared with other payment methods.
In general, a lack of know-how aggravates all emerg-
ing vulnerabilities and risks associated, which will be pre-
sented in the following paragraphs. In particular, a lack of
know-how with regard to the administration of cryptocur-
rencies, the purpose of the public and the corresponding pri-
vate key, and the concept and properties of cryptocurrencies
might have implications ranging from reduced operational
efficiency to a total loss of all bitcoins that a company owned
(provided the company uses only the hot storage option lim-
ited to one wallet). In this context, it has to be emphasized
that an executed transaction is irreversible, so there is no pos-
sibility to recover these lost bitcoins.
A solid education and training on cryptocurrencies might
aid the effective prevention and mitigation of these vulnera-
bilities as well as the associated risks. It is not a prerequisite
for a company and its employees to completely understand
blockchain technology in order to implement the acceptance
of Bitcoin payments. However, a basic understanding of the
technology and the necessary risk awareness/evaluation is
required. To sum up, a lack of knowledge could have a vast
(negative) impact on a company’s effective and efficient re-
source use.
PI: Total loss of all bitcoins, misuse of superior
knowledge to commit (irreversible) fraud due to
internal or external circumstances, operational
losses/ inefficiencies
PCA: Employee training, periodical updates on
crypto-markets and price developments, manu-
als
The Administration of Cryptocurrencies
As previously described, bitcoins are digital files "with a cash
value in the hands of the individual in possession of the file"
(Grant and Hogan, 2015, p. 32). If this digital value were to
be stolen, the company would have no further opportunities
to access its initial bitcoins, and they would finally be lost as
there is no way to easily trace back the transaction and re-
verse it. This is comparable to losing one’s purse and all the
cash inside it (Choo, 2015, p. 300). Particularly with regard
to the dealing and storage of this digital value, an organiza-
tion’s management must address two interrelated questions:
first, who is responsible for the (private) key administration
and, second, how is this key to be stored?
The owner of the private key has the full access rights
and ownership of the corresponding bitcoins, which implies
that safekeeping is the most important role in the operational
dealing of cryptocurrencies. In a risk report, the insurance
company Lloyds (2015, p. 7) described the private key as
a digitized "secret such as banking credentials, intellectual
property, or private photographs," which could be or could
become a decisive factor in an organization’s success.
Therefore, it plays an important role in not only the ad-
ministration of this key within a company but also in clearly
determining the responsibilities and duties concerning the
administration of the bitcoins received. In this context, there
is also the possibility to outsource the private key’s adminis-
tration to an intermediary or an external provider like a pay-
ment processor or an exchange platform (Lloyds, 2015, p. 7).
Key storage by an external provider offers the advantages of
a professional and secure administration (Franco, 2014, p.
131; Grant and Hogan, 2015, p. 33). However, this is also
related with additional costs and risks, especially with regard
to the reliability of an external service provider. History has
already unveiled such risks; for instance, the exchange plat-
form Mt. Gox was hacked in 2011 and 2014 which resulted
in around 650,000 bitcoins being stolen from its customers
and the company finally suffering insolvency (Hern, 2014,
18. March).
Regardless of whether storage is outsourced or not, there
are in general two types of wallets used to keep bitcoins: hot
and cold storage wallets. Blockchain researcher Toshendra
Sharma (2017, 14 November) states that a hot wallet can be
compared with a checking account, whereas a cold wallet is
a kind of savings account. The question then arises of which
type of wallet a company chooses and how these wallets will
be secured. Although a cold wallet is an offline wallet that is
not connected to the Internet, hot wallets or web wallets are
stored on devices that are connected to the Internet and di-
rectly communicate with the Bitcoin network (Franco, 2014,
p. 126).
This cold storage option is available in several forms: the
private key could be saved on an external media storage (e.g.,
USB flash drives or optical disks), on a paper wallet (by print-
ing the private key on a piece of paper), or on a special hard-
ware wallet like Trezor (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 237; Franco,
2014, pp. 126f.). The benefit of a cold wallet is that it is
secure against hacker attacks, but due to their physical and
tangible form, they require appropriate storage facilities like
a vault (Franco, 2014, pp. 17-18). In contrast, a web-based
wallet is usually provided by an external provider and is in
the form of an online account (with additional features) in
which funds can be deposited and accessed, similar to online
banking (Franco, 2014, p. 131). Users can access the ac-
count by means of an authentication process (e.g., 2-factor
authentication or multi-signature), after which they can con-
duct transactions. Additionally, the use of a hot wallet is more
appropriate in order to accept payments because of a faster
verification process (Sharma, 2017, 14 November).
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Depending on the choice of wallet type and/or third-party
involvement, the safekeeping of keys requires appropriate cy-
ber security measures, physical protection, or both. In gen-
eral, it is recommended to store larger amounts of cryptocur-
rency assets in cold wallets, while hot wallets would be a
better choice for daily operations. (Antonopoulos, 2015, p.
237; Sharma, 2017, 14 November)
PI: Total loss of bitcoins due to inappropriate hot
storage, physical theft due to unreasonable cold
storage, employee fraud in operational dealings
PCA: Outsourcing of "cold" private key storage,
e.g., in the vaults of multinational banks, limi-
tations of access rights to the company’s wallet,
multi-signature wallets, encryption of private
keys, diversification of bitcoins (hot and cold
wallets), implementing holding limits on the hot
wallets
IT Risks
Particularly in the context of IT, recent technological innova-
tions have led to the emergence of new risks. The two kinds
of risks associated with Bitcoin are global and local. Global
risks or "attacks" are aimed at manipulating the entire Bit-
coin network, while local risks or "attacks" are characterized
by the intention to get specific access to a private key or pass-
word of a company’s hot wallet "in order to gain control of
bitcoins and the matched public address" (Lloyds, 2015, p.
7). On account of significant price developments and the re-
sulting increase in the value of bitcoins, the cryptocurrency
is an extremely attractive target for hackers and thus for lo-
cal attacks. This is further encouraged by the instant diver-
sion and irrevocability of transactions without the need of
converting "identity information or account tokens – such as
credit cards, and bank accounts – into value after compro-
mising them" (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 236).
Therefore, vendors accepting Bitcoin should be aware of
the importance of private keys (or wallet passwords). For
instance, they should not store this key in the form of any
other data file (including encrypted files) on their desktop
computers (Antonopoulos, 2015, p. 236). However, the risk
of a local attack can be mitigated by means of appropriate
cyber security measures, the necessary know-how, and the
appropriate distribution of coins on different storage medi-
ums.
Controversially, global risks (e.g., a 51%-attack or a
Distributed-Denial-of-Service (DDoS)-attack) which are closely
related to some vulnerabilities of blockchain technology, can-
not usually be controlled and influenced by the company
itself (Lloyds, 2015, pp. 10f.). The scope of this thesis, how-
ever, does not cover an in-depth analysis of these IT-related
(blockchain) risks.
PI: Private key/ password theft (depending on
whether hot or cold storage) through hacking,
skimming, etc., and the resulting operational
losses
PCA: Appropriate IT infrastructure/ risk manage-
ment, implementation of additional encryption
standards, several storage options (hot and cold
storage)
The Irreversibility of Transactions
In general, the irreversibility of transactions can be seen as
an advantage but also as a source of some risks. For instance,
if a local attack were to be successful and the "thief" were to
gain access to a company’s private key, the bitcoins could be
grasped immediately and distributed to different wallet ad-
dresses (Lloyds, 2015, p. 8). In such a case, there would
be no possibility of reversing the transactions, i.e., there is
no charge-back option such as in the case of a disputed ser-
vice by a credit card provider (IMF, 2016, p. 29; Vigna and
Casey, 2016, p. 127). Moreover, one has to keep in mind
that a customer has no right to refund a transaction. If any-
thing goes wrong, the risks of default payments have to be
covered by the Bitcoin network participant or the Bitcoin ac-
cepting vendor, because there is no central authority that has
the responsibility to do so (IMF, 2017, p. 29). This makes
a fraud case especially challenging since there is no relevant
authority that could freeze or seize an order (IMF, 2017, p.
28).
However, this irreversibility can also be an advantage
given the new digital business models, e.g., when digital files
are instantly delivered and cannot be reversed, like in the
case of the download of songs or software (Sixt, 2017, p.
89).
PI: Operational losses due to default payments,
wrong transactions, and fraud
PCA: n/a
4.1.2. Reporting Risks
Reporting Standards
Grant and Hogan (2015, pp. 30-31)argue that the explicit
reporting and classification of the bitcoins received depends
on their usage, i.e., either as a medium of exchange or as an
investment. Nevertheless, there is not yet a consistent regu-
lation concerning the explicit classification of bitcoins (Lind-
ner and Meyer, 2017, p. 29). In the following paragraphs,
the reporting of bitcoins will be analyzed in the context of
Germany and Switzerland.
Lindner and Meyer (2017, p. 29) have questioned the
explicit reporting of bitcoins as "liquid funds" in Switzerland,
given their significant price volatility; however, it might be
also possible if this requirement were to be fulfilled. Accord-
ing to Heer, 2014, 10. December, the classification of bit-
coins as liquid funds is excluded. Instead, bitcoins should be
reported as "short-term assets with market price" and thus
should be classified as short- or long-term securities (Heer,
2014, 10. December; Lindner and Meyer, 2017, p. 29). In
summary, the explicit classification depends on the usage of
bitcoins, for instance, if the bitcoins are used for investment
purposes and will be held for a longer term, the coins should
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be classified as long-term financial assets such as commodi-
ties like gold or oil (Lindner and Meyer, 2017, p. 29).
In Germany, the analysis of Kanton (2017, p. 2735) re-
veals that according to the German Handelsgesetzbuch, bit-
coins have to be reported as "other assets," part of the cur-
rent assets, or as "acquired intangible assets" as part of the
fixed assets. It is extremely important to comply with the na-
tional reporting standards, because a violation could lead to
the fraudulent misrepresentation of the financial statements,
an inaccurate company valuation, and issues with tax eva-
sion.
PI: (Fraudulent) misrepresentation of financial
statements, inaccurate company valuation, eva-
sion of tax
PCA: Establishing guidelines for the national re-
porting of Bitcoin
The Price Volatility & Exchange Rate Risks
One of the most common risks with cryptocurrencies and,
Bitcoin especially, is the considerable degree of price volatil-
ity. Appendix 2 contains an extracted chart of the Bit-
coin/USD spot rate from January 16, 2017, to January 16,
2018. It shows the significant volatility of the cryptocurrency.
Whereas one bitcoin was traded at around USD 800 at the
beginning of 2017, the value increased by 1400% to approx.
USD 12,000 in January 2018. In order to further exhibit
these price fluctuations, the Bloomberg "Return-on-Change"
function (the yellow line below the price index chart) was
added. This function is a technical indicator of volatility,
measuring the price change between current price and the
price ten days ago in percent. Therein, substantial fluctua-
tions of 20% are no rarity.
The extreme price volatility of incoming funds first has an
impact on the exchange rate risk (FX risk), i.e., the price at
which the bitcoins will be converted into national currencies.
In turn, this might affect the entity’s effective and efficient op-
erational use of resources as well as the company’s financial
reporting.
With regard to operational effectiveness, it can be pri-
marily stated that the received funds could appreciate but
also depreciate within in ten days by about 15-20% (cf. Ap-
pendix 2), and thus significantly affect the operational rev-
enue within a very short period of time. In addition, assum-
ing that the company uses Bitcoin funds for operational pur-
poses and as a medium of exchange, it could even lead to
liquidity shortages or considerable FX losses, for instance, in
case of paying a supplier if the price drops by about 20% in
72 hours (Grant and Hogan, 2015, p. 30).
Financial reporting might also be influenced by these
FX fluctuations. On the one hand, it is quite difficult to
match any revenue forecasts or conduct appropriate budget-
ing (Hoelscher, 2014, p. 24). On the other hand, depending
on the usage of Bitcoin and the applicable national law, the
exchange of bitcoins in national currencies could result in
tax charges.
PI: Operational losses due to FX fluctuations, liq-
uidity shortages, tax charges, inability to convert
Bitcoin into other currencies due to a lack of liq-
uidity
PCA: Hedging of bitcoins, instant conversion
by means of a payment processor, establishing
guidelines related to the monitoring of liquidity
in Bitcoin markets
4.1.3. Compliance Risks
Tax-Compliance
In general, more is known about the taxation of Bitcoin than
about its financial reporting (Lindner and Meyer, 2017, p.
28). Nevertheless, cryptocurrencies exhibit a high potential
for tax evasion due to the fact that participants do not need
to disclose their identity, and there is no means to identify
beneficial owners (IMF, 2016, p. 30). For appropriate tax
treatment, it is first important to know who is the subject of
the tax, i.e., a natural person or a judicial body. Addition-
ally, there is also the question of the classification of bitcoins,
i.e., whether it is a form of currency or a short- or long-term
security.
In case of a judicial body, the received payments have to
be recognized in the income statement (calculated in the na-
tional currency by the time the funds are received) and could
be further activated in the financial statements (see Section
4.1.2). If they are instantly converted to fiat currencies, they
will be recognized as revenue, and there would be no further
tax issues. Controversially, if the bitcoins are held as short-
or long-term security, the resulting capital gains (in case of
realization) would be additionally subject to the corporate
income tax in Switzerland or the personal income tax and
corporate income tax in Germany (Lindner and Meyer, 2017,
p. 29; Schmidt, 2018, 18. January).
In Switzerland, a natural person is not faced with any
specific tax-compliance issues if the bitcoins are used for pri-
vate purposes, and even if any capital gains are realized with
exception of Swiss property tax (Kanton, 2017).
In contrast, in Germany, any bitcoin capital gains are sub-
ject to German income tax regulations. Only if a natural
person holds the bitcoins for a period longer than one year,
are the achieved capital gains tax free (Schmidt, 2018, 18.
January). The relevant valuation method is the first-in-first-
out method, which can be made transparent by means of the
blockchain (Schmidt, 2018, 18. January).
PI: Tax evasion and its legal implications
PCA: Establish guidelines for the recognition and
valuation of Bitcoin transactions with an empha-
sis on regulatory compliance
Anti-Money-Laundering and Know-Your-Customer Issues
From a financial integrity perspective, the properties of
Bitcoin do raise concerns, particularly with regard to its
anonymity and the cross-border reach of transactions (IMF,
2016, p. 27). Although every transaction is publicly avail-
able, the users are virtually anonymous (Grant and Hogan,
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2015, p. 32). This implies that the concept of Bitcoin has
a high degree of transparency in the transactions conducted
but not with regard to who has conducted the transaction.
This is sometimes described as pseudo-anonymous, because
of which cryptocurrencies are fundamentally vulnerable to
money laundering. The IMF (2017, p. 27) states that bit-
coins can be used "to conceal or disguise the illicit origin
or sanctioned destination of funds, thus facilitating money
laundering (ML), terrorist financing (TF), and the evasion
of sanctions." Furthermore, bitcoins are likely to be used for
cyber-related crimes, e.g., on the "dark web" or as ransom
money to decrypt data previously encrypted by malware.
Regulators have adopted different approaches to mitigate
these risks (cf. Chapter 2.1.4). In general, only financial in-
termediaries are faced with AML- and KYC-related regula-
tions, so the vendors and their users have not yet faced these
compliance issues (IMF, 2016, p. 28; Piller, 2017, pp. 8-9;
Choo, 2015, p. 304). This implies that a vendor accepting
Bitcoin has to take appropriate measures to ensure that his
customers are in line with the KYC- and AML- related laws.
PI: Accepting illicit funds, being liable to prose-
cution
PCA: Customer due diligence, reporting of suspi-
cious transactions
4.2. Empirical Analysis
The following empirical analysis confronts the participat-
ing organizations with the risks identified in order to answer
the second research question:
• Are the companies and the responsible employees
aware of these risks, and how do they evaluate and
address them?
4.2.1. Payment Process
If a company accepts Bitcoin payments, it is first necessary
to understand how it receives and deals with them, i.e., to
what extent the transaction process is self-managed and for
which purposes the received bitcoins are used.
The analysis reveals that 44.62% of the participants em-
ploy a merchant service provider to process the incoming Bit-
coin funds, whereas 55.38% indicated that they manage the
payments without any third-party involvement (cf. Figure
15). Since the use of a payment processor can help mitigate
or eliminate some emerging risk factors (e.g., the FX risk or
the payment default risk), the analysis made a distinction be-
tween participants who do and do not use merchant service
providers.
We found that around half of the participants in our sur-
vey use payment processors. Although there are many rea-
sons behind this decision, Figure 16 enable the derivation of
two overriding reasons.
Note: The participants were allowed to choose multiple
answers and the sum of the results is therefore over 100%.
Figure 16: Reasons for Using a Payment Processor The
first reason is the mitigation of risks. Among the respon-
dents, 62.07% mentioned using payment processors for the
prevention of the FX risk through the possibility of instantly
exchanging bitcoins into fiat currencies, and 44.83% cited
covering a potential payment default due to the immediate
payment confirmation and the liability of the merchant ser-
vice provider. Moreover, the appropriate documentation and
invoicing that is closely related to appropriate financial re-
porting and the resulting reporting risks, was mentioned by
31.03% of the participants.
The second dominant reason for involving a merchant
service provider was for simplification and convenience,
which leads to lower entry barriers for potential vendors
accepting Bitcoin payments. In fact, 58.62% of the respon-
dents justified using a merchant service provider because of
the infrastructure provided, such as a shopping cart plugin-in
for e-commerce or applications and interfaces for point-of-
sales. Furthermore, even 58.62% of the participants cited
implementing a payment processor because it enables the
acceptance of Bitcoin payments without in-depth knowledge.
The analysis also investigated the other half of partici-
pants who do not use third-party providers because of its po-
tential redundancy and the costs involved. Therefore, the
analysis focused on the awareness of risks that might be po-
tentially covered or mitigated by means of payment proces-
sor, i.e., the FX risk, defaulting payments and the proper doc-
umenting and invoicing which is closely related to reporting
and tax risks.
The results show that 80% neither experienced a payment
default nor viewed the documentation and invoicing as a pit-
fall, which is consistent with the initial assumption that a pay-
ment processor would be redundant. Controversially, the FX
risk which could be almost completely eliminated, was men-
tioned by 45.71% of the participants as a risk, and 37.14%
recognized the reporting and tax issues as a risk.
This study also addressed the question of how a company
deals the incoming Bitcoin funds. In general, there are two
different possibilities: either bitcoins are only used as a pay-
ment method and they will be instantly exchanged into na-
tional currencies, or the bitcoins will be held by the company
for use as liquid funds or as an investment. In this context,
storage plays a critical role, because if the bitcoins are used
as an investment or as a liquid fund in order to pay invoices
or suppliers, the company needs an appropriate Bitcoin ad-
ministration. Controversially, if the bitcoins are exchanged
immediately or on the following day, the Bitcoin storage be-
comes more or less obsolete.
The pie chart in Figure 17 shows the results concern-
ing the handling of incoming Bitcoin payments. It is appar-
ent that almost 62% (using cryptocurrency as liquid funds
or investment) of the respondents store the incoming funds,
whereas around 38% exchange incoming funds instantly or
by the following day.
The 62% of participants storing the funds are especially
faced with the threat of proper Bitcoin administration and
all its related risks. Hence, the second part of the empirical
investigation analyzes the administration and duties related
to Bitcoin payments.
In summary, the first part of this evaluation concerning
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Figure 15: Third-Party Involvement in the Payment Process
Figure 16: Reasons for Using a Payment Processor; Note: The participants were allowed to choose multiple answers and the
sum of the results is therefore over 100%.
Figure 17: Dealing with Incoming Bitcoin Funds
the payments process reveals that there is no definite trend
of how this process plays out in practice, i.e., with or with-
out a merchant service provider. This implies a consider-
able issue for the development of a proper Cryptocurrency IC
Framework, because all potential risks have to be addressed.
Furthermore, the results of the present study demonstrate
that the use of a payment process is justified by two reasons:
risk mitigation/elimination and the purposes of simplifica-
tion and convenience. In context of risk mitigation, the FX
risk was mentioned as the greatest danger which could be
basically eliminated. Moreover, approx. two thirds of the
companies store the incoming funds and are thus confronted
with a reasonable administrations of Bitcoin payments.
4.2.2. Administration of Bitcoin Payments
It is important to understand that there is not necessarily
a connection between Bitcoin storage and the involvement
of a payment processor. Even though a kind of third-party
provider is employed, cryptocurrencies might be transferred
and stored in one’s "own" wallets. Therefore, the crucial
question is if the bitcoins are stored or not, whether in the
form of an investment or as liquid funds, as discussed in the
previous chapter.
When bitcoins are stored, a company is faced with several
options that are listed in Figure 18.
As can be seen in Figure 18, the analysis indicates that
the majority of participants (40.54%) store their bitcoins in
a merchant service provider’s wallet. In this context, the pri-
vate key storage is outsourced, with the resulting risk of third-
party reliability. When only the hot storage method is used
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Figure 18: Options for Bitcoin Storage
(16.22%), the company faces the same advantages, but the
difference is that the risk of third-party reliability is due to
the wallet provider and not the payment processor. In both
cases, the administration of rights to access the third-party
wallet plays a significant role.
Moreover, we found that 24.32% of companies use both
methods, and 13.51% only use the cold storage option.
Therefore, the storage and administration have to be clearly
determined. Finally, 5.41% of the respondents stated that
they did not know how their bitcoins are stored.
In addition to Bitcoin storage, this study also investigated
who is generally responsible for the administration of bit-
coins, i.e., who has the right to access the private key or wal-
let and to which field of competency this duty is assigned.
Several noteworthy results in this context were the answers
"nobody" and "everybody" in response to the question, "Who
has the admission or the relevant rights to access your com-
pany wallet?". With the exception of these answers, the ma-
jority of participants (90.91%) mentioned that a specific per-
son has access to the company’s wallet. The responsible per-
sons are typically the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief
Digital Officer (CDO), IT Administrator or Head of Account-
ing, as well as their assistants or representatives.
Responses to the question regarding the number of people
who have the access rights ranged from one to ten employ-
ees, with an average of two persons having the rights to ac-
cess the wallet. With regard to their field of competency, this
duty is typically assigned to the senior management (CEO,
CDO, Chief Technology Officer (CTO) or the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO)), or an executive manager such as the IT Ad-
ministrator or the Head of Accounting.
4.2.3. Risk Awareness & Evaluation
The third part of the empirical analysis focused on the
awareness and evaluation of the risks identified in Chapter
4.1.
The respondents were first asked to describe their aware-
ness of the risks by evaluating if there is a risk potential in
general and how likely it is that this risk will occur. It was
possible to choose from five options ranging from "no risk" to
"extremely high risk." The results are summarized in Figure
19 below.
The data suggests that the experienced potential of the
risks identified is rather low. In particular, the irreversibility
of the transactions does not pose a risk for 40.32% of the par-
ticipants, whereas 27.42% rated it as a low risk, and 20.97%
as a moderate risk. This implies that only around 5% consid-
ered the irreversibility of the transactions to be a threat. Fur-
thermore, risks related to the financial reporting and taxes
were rated comparatively low. In contrast, the price volatil-
ity and the resulting FX risk of Bitcoin exhibited the highest
risk potential, with 23.44% of the participants classifying it
as an extremely high risk and 18.75% as a high or moderate
risk. Moreover, a lack of know-how, risks within the admin-
istration of Bitcoin, and cyber risks were ranked as moderate
risk or greater by at least 45% of the participants.
Besides the risk evaluation, the results shown in Figure
19 also reveal that 9.52% of the participants were not able
to assess the compliance risks. With regard to the blockchain
risks (7.81%), the cyber risk (6.35%), the financial reporting
risk (6.25%), and the irreversibility of transactions (6.45%),
an increased uncertainty related to the evaluation of the risk
potential was also apparent.
Nevertheless, in order to clearly interpret the results, the
authors calculated the mean of the risks evaluated (no risk
– 1, extremely high risk – 5) based on the responses. Sub-
sequently, the risks were classified and ranked according to
their classification and risk potential, which can be seen in
Table 3.
The analysis also aimed at investigating the severity of the
potential of damage that could be caused by the risks identi-
fied. Here, the participants had the option to evaluate the risk
severity by choosing a number between one and ten in order
to assess and further express the damage potential from their
point of view. Here, one represented a low or almost no dam-
age potential, and ten an extremely high damage potential.
The results can be seen in Table 4.
The figures reveal that the companies generally assess the
severity of potential damages as low. Their greatest concerns
are about risks related to FX, cyber, and blockchain. Contro-
versially, financial reporting, compliance, tax risks, and the
irreversibility of transactions are considered to have a lower
potential for damage.
These results have been summarized in a risk matrix cre-
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Figure 19: Evaluation of the Risks Identified
ated by the author based on the data available. Taking into
account the centered extract (cf. Figure 20) of the estab-
lished risk matrix (the complete risk matrix can be found in
Appendix 6), we can conclude that the FX risk is experienced
as the greatest threat. Cyber and blockchain risks as well as
the lack of responsibility concerning know-how and Bitcoin
administration play a comparatively significant role. In par-
ticular, the irreversibility of the transactions was ranked as a
lower risk.
4.2.4. Risk Handling
The last part of the empirical study deals with the poten-
tial and practical handling of the risks identified. We con-
sidered only those risks that can be effectively influenced by
a company, for instance, a company cannot influence price
volatility or blockchain risks but it can control the exchange
rate or cyber risks.
The potential development of internal controls was ana-
lyzed in this regard. According to the results, especially re-
garding insufficient know-how and the segregation of duties
(no clear responsibilities concerning Bitcoin administration),
the development of internal controls seems possible. Around
70% of the respondents stated that the development is rather
or absolutely possible. However, only 30% were of the opin-
ion that it is rather not possible respectively impossible to
develop internal controls in order to hedge the FX risk of Bit-
coin. A detailed overview of these responses can be seen Fig-
ure 21.
In addition to the potential development, the practical im-
plementation was also analyzed. In this context, only 46.15%
of the companies have implemented internal controls or sim-
ilar measures in order to ensure the appropriate dealing of
Bitcoin payments (cf. Figure 22).
In this context, the explicit dealing was scrutinized, i.e.,
which specific internal controls or measures have been im-
plemented. The results are summarized in Appendix 7 and
serve as an important component of the risk control matrix
provided in Chapter 4.3.1.
The results indicate that the risks identified are prop-
erly addressed only by a few companies. In order to over-
come a lack of know-how, several organizations have im-
plemented regular training sessions or workshops on cryp-
tocurrencies, their purpose, and dealing. Some companies
also provide their employees with manuals and have cre-
ated internal guidelines intended to impart the knowledge
required for operational business. The staff also gets the thus
so far voluntary opportunity to watch YouTube tutorials dur-
ing work hours as a form of e-learning, so as to increase their
level of knowledge.
With regard to the appropriate administration and stor-
age of bitcoins, many enterprises have decided to limit the
responsibilities to an extremely small group of people, for in-
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Figure 20: Extract of the Risk Matrix
Figure 21: Development of Potential Internal Controls
Figure 22: Implementation of Internal Controls
stance, only the CEO and his or her representative typically
have rights to access the company’s wallet. In this context,
several companies emphasized that the responsibilities have
to be clearly documented and executed in order to prevent
a segregation of duties. The storage options have already
been explicitly analyzed in the previous chapters; however,
a few companies were of the opinion that the cold storage
itself represents a form of control measure. Additionally, one
company is using a software that encrypts the corresponding
pins/keys to further enhance its level of security.
The FX risks and the relevant internal controls are more
or less obsolete if an enterprise instantly converts its received
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Bitcoin funds into fiat currencies. As previously discussed,
most companies indicated that it is impossible or rather not
possible to develop internal controls, which is consistent with
the findings concerning the internal controls related to FX
risks. Besides the opportunity to completely eliminate the ex-
change rate risk through instant conversion, the participants
mentioned that observation, analysis, and relevant documen-
tation are also internal control measures taken to mitigate the
FX risk.
In the area of reporting risks – the identified financial re-
porting risks but risks related to tax-compliance – the imple-
mented IC measures are quite similar. In both cases, the ap-
propriate documentation and the "four-eyes" principle were
mentioned as the most important internal controls. Nev-
ertheless, manual control or the additional involvement of
an external advisor was proposed as a useful supplementary
measure.
Furthermore, the analysis revealed several interesting IC
measures regarding risks related to KYC and AML issues. Pri-
marily, it can be stated that some companies use additional
KYC checks in form of an obligatory part of the payment re-
spectively ordering process, with suspicious customers being
immediately reported to the authorities. The internal map-
ping of public addresses to real customers/identities in order
to get a more transparent customer profile is yet another ap-
proach. The involvement of an internal IT Forensic division
was mentioned as an internal control as well. Apart from
these measures, the permanent monitoring of changes in the
national regulations is certainly required to overcome any
compliance risks.
The involvement of an internal IT Forensic division (if
any) plays a significant role in mitigating cyber risks as well.
By means of such a division or through internal IT risk man-
agement, potential threats can be prevented or detected in
their early stages. Conducting training sessions or workshops
to enhance the risk awareness and knowledge of companies’
employees is also an appropriate measure. If a company
would like to bring down the cyber risks (of Bitcoin storage)
to an acceptable level of risk, they could even consider using
cold wallets and an additional encryption software.
4.3. Recommendations with Regard to Cryptocurrencies
Based on the results of the previous two research ques-
tions, the author established a risk control matrix in order
to provide a clear overview and summary of the findings.
These conclusions will be incorporated into a holistic Cryp-
tocurrency IC Framework, which will be developed along the
lines of the COSO 2013 IC Framework. This will finally lead
us to the answer of the third research question:
• Are there any general control activities and recommen-
dations necessary to ensure an appropriate risk man-
agement in the handling of cryptocurrencies?
4.3.1. Risk Control Matrix
The author has summarized the findings of the previous
two research questions in the form of a risk control matrix
to provide comprehensive and transparent overview of the
risks identified and to outline recommendations concerning
their handling. As proposed in Chapter 2.2.2.2, the matrix is
divided into three superordinate categories – objectives, risk
analysis and control activities – which will be further speci-
fied.
The first category of "objectives" is sub-divided in two sec-
tions: the first column shows the general objectives of the
risk control matrix with regard to cryptocurrencies, and the
second column categorizes the general objectives according
to the three classifications proposed by the COSO 2013 IC
Framework.
The following three columns represent a subdivision of
the category of "risk analysis" and display the findings of
the investigation. Therefore, it displays the identified risks
(Chapter 4.1) and their corresponding risk potential and
severity (cf. Chapter 4.2.3) as evaluated by the survey par-
ticipants.
Finally, the last category summarizes the "control activ-
ities." This was done by selecting the appropriate measures
proposed in the empirical analysis in Chapter 4.2.4 and by
adding the potential control activities mentioned in Chapter
4.1. Additionally, the author assessed the types of controls
(preventive = pr, directive = di, detective = de or corrective
= cr) and the forms of the control activities, i.e., automated
(a) or manual (m). The entire risk matrix can be found in
Table 5.
4.3.2. Cryptocurrency IC Framework
The third research question also aimed at identifying gen-
eral recommendations to ensure appropriate risk manage-
ment in the handling of cryptocurrencies. Hence, the author
decided to establish a framework that serves as a set of guide-
lines to implement and handle cryptocurrencies as a payment
method and to ensure appropriate risk management.
The Cryptocurrency IC Framework developed is along the
lines of the COSO 2013 IC Framework and adapted to cryp-
tocurrencies based on the research results obtained through
the example of Bitcoin. The framework can be seen Figure
23, with a higher resolution version in Appendix 8. Figure
23 shows a framework based on five processing steps. How-
ever, the established Cryptocurrency IC Framework does not
present a "5-stages-model" – it should be rather understood
as a continuous circle of processes. Moreover, it is important
to understand that the framework represents a holistic ap-
proach and should thus be viewed as a whole and not just as
a collection of its five components, each of which is described
in further detail below:
1. Understand: Even though the analysis revealed that
some or the other risk is experienced as more or less
dangerous, the holistic model does not start by tackling
specific risk factors. The fundamental prerequisite for
the proper implementation and dealing of cryptocur-
rencies is a basic knowledge of its technology – the
blockchain – the concept of a cryptocurrencies, the pay-
ment process, and the corresponding administration of
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Figure 23: Cryptocurrency IC Framework; Source: Own illustration on the basis of the COSO 2013 IC Framework
incoming funds, such as hot or cold storage methods.
Since cryptocurrencies are based on a new technology
that has no other existing counterpart, a lack of knowl-
edge would certainly aggravate every potential risk.
Hence, it is imperative for a company to understand
what a cryptocurrency is and how to deal with it in or-
der to develop and further implement an appropriate
risk management approach for its operational dealings.
2. Identify & Assess: In the second step, the potential
risks that might emerge from the implementation of
the new payment method have to be identified. For
the risk identification process of cryptocurrencies, all
potential threats that could influence the operational,
reporting, and compliance objectives need to be an-
alyzed and summarized (cf. the identified risks re-
lated to cryptocurrencies in Chapter 4.1). This pro-
cess is continuous and not one-time because of ongo-
ing changes in the company environment. However,
when this process is "completed," the subsequent risk
evaluation begins, which can be done by means of a
risk assessment (cf. Chapter 4.2). By evaluating the
risks previously identified according to their probabil-
ity and severity, the risk assessment helps to determine
the greatest risks.
3. Develop Control Activities: Thereafter, appropriate
control activities have to be developed to mitigate the
risks, particularly the most harmful ones, and these
then need to be implemented. In this context, a risk
control matrix (cf. Chapter 4.3.1) is a useful tool to
help achieve this as it increases the transparency for all
stakeholders and enhances their risk awareness, which
in turn supports the process of developing control ac-
tivities addressing the risks identified. These control
activities may vary in terms of their form (preventive,
directive, detective, or corrective) and type (automatic
or manual). In the case of cryptocurrencies, it is more
reasonable to focus on automatic, preventive, and di-
rective control activities due to the irreversibility of
transactions and the resulting irrevocable losses.
4. Inform & Communicate: Nevertheless, it is not enough
to simply implement an effective internal control sys-
tem because the controls also have to be correctly
applied and executed. Therefore, when the control
activities are implemented, appropriate information
and communication within the company (across sev-
eral business units) is also required. This particularly
represents a problem in the context of cryptocurren-
cies because the most important information about this
complex technology-based payment method has to be
selected. Moreover, the necessary information needs to
be prepared and communicated in a way that any em-
ployee is able to comprehend the payment method, the
risks associated, and the necessary measures needed
to mitigate them.
5. Monitoring Activities: Monitoring plays a significant
role in ensuring that the controls implemented are effi-
cient and effective. This implies that internal measures
like guidelines, demarcated responsibilities, etc., have
to be monitored and, if necessary, adapted. Further-
more, the external environment (e.g., the emergence of
new cryptocurrencies, changes in blockchain technol-
ogy, new regulations, etc.) should also be continuously
screened so as to identify newly emerging risk factors.
If there are any changes or new risks recognized, the
company needs to conduct a renewed risk assessment,
which means that the circle will start anew.
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The established Cryptocurrency IC Framework, such as
the COSO 2013 IC Framework, serves as a tool for an orga-
nization’s management to develop a reasonable internal con-
trol (system), particularly with regard using cryptocurrencies
as a payment method. The framework, however, does need
to be adjusted and adapted to the particular conditions of
each company, such as its size, regulatory environment, or
the share of Bitcoin payments. Also, one must always take
into account that the framework increases the likelihood of
the company achieving its objectives, but it gives no abso-
lute assurance that the goals will be definitely accomplished
or that the emerging risks of accepting Bitcoin funds will be
completely eliminated.
5. Conclusion
5.1. Summary of results
The literature review shows that the implementation of
cryptocurrencies has led to the emergence of new risks that
might affect a company’s operational effectiveness, reporting
objectives, and compliance regulations. Due to this, its op-
erational effectiveness could suffer from a lack of know-how,
a segregation of duties concerning the administration of Bit-
coin funds, IT-related risks, and issues like the irreversibility
of transactions. The reporting objective might be affected
by the various national reporting standards and the resul-
tant misrepresentation of financial statements but also due
to the considerable FX risk of bitcoins received. Further, the
compliance objectives could be influenced by issues related
to tax-compliance, AML, and KYC.
By confronting companies that accept Bitcoin payments
with these risks, it could be determined that their risk aware-
ness and the corresponding evaluation of the risks proposed
is quite poor. Risks related to FX are currently experienced
as the most significant, and cyber risks are also considered as
serious threats. The administration of Bitcoin plays an im-
portant role here as both risks are highly interrelated, for
instance, private key storage depends on the (internal IT-
related) storage option chosen. In contrast, the irreversibil-
ity of transactions and emerging tax risks are less regarded as
threats for the operational dealing of cryptocurrencies. More-
over, the analysis revealed that methods to deal with the risks
of cryptocurrencies are not yet firmly established, and many
corporations had a significant lack of know-how in this re-
gard. This can be seen in the fact that less than half (46%) of
the participating companies have implemented internal con-
trols, and around 29% do not recognize a segregation of du-
ties as a risk so as to ensure appropriate risk management
concerning the operational dealing of cryptocurrencies.
Nevertheless, a majority of the companies (46%) using
internal controls have implemented, presented effective con-
trol activities to mitigate the potential risks identified. On
the basis of the results obtained through this study, the au-
thor has developed a feasible concept that can be further
adapted and supplemented depending on each organization’s
size, risk complexity, and additional changes in the cryptocur-
rency environment. By considering the Cryptocurrency IC
Framework in combination with the integrated risk control
matrix, an effective approach is proposed, aimed at ensur-
ing the proper handling of cryptocurrencies and increasing
the likelihood of an organization achieving its operational,
reporting, and compliance objectives.
5.2. Discussion
The findings demonstrate that new, unequivocal risks
emerge through the implementation of cryptocurrencies as
a payment method, which can be due, on the one hand, to
the properties of cryptocurrencies and on the other hand,
to their underlying technology– the blockchain. However,
the risks presented in this study may not be considered as
a definitive list of all threats that might ever arise from us-
ing cryptocurrencies. In today’s dynamic environment, a
company must adapt to its environment, which requires the
continuous monitoring and identification of newly emerging
risks (Rüegg-Stürm and Grand, 2015, p. 78).
In general, the empirical analysis presented in this paper
leads us to believe that companies do recognize these risks
but only to a limited degree. Of course, only a small part of
payments today are made using Bitcoin. This could be due to
insufficient knowledge about the implementation of Bitcoin
as a payment method but could also be due to its considerable
increase in value during the last twelve months, which has
made the cryptocurrency more attractive as a form of invest-
ment rather than a medium of exchange (cf. Appendix 2).
However, as the share of crypto payments increases, its risk
potential and severity evaluation will also become more im-
portant, because Bitcoin payments gain importance as their
share in a company’s total revenue increases. A logical im-
plication of this is that the risk management involved in its
operational dealing also becomes more important.
With regard to the risk awareness and risk assessment
conducted, the FX risk was considered as the most impor-
tant threat. One must mention that this risk might be com-
pletely eliminated by means of a payment processor and the
immediate exchange into the relevant national currency. At
first glance, the involvement of a merchant service provider
simplifies the acceptance of Bitcoin payments and, moreover,
several risks are already covered, such as the FX risk, the
risk of payments defaulting, and, sometimes, KYC-related
issues as well. Nevertheless, it is difficult to strike a bal-
ance between the advantages and disadvantages of a third-
party provider because of the issue of third-party reliabil-
ity and the processing fee per transaction. In this context,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Professor Michael A.
Cusumano (2014, p. 24) states that „payment processors and
wallet firms are critical intermediaries and have also raised a
lot of venture capital."
This statement indirectly introduces the second most sig-
nificant risk, i.e., cyber risks, and the interrelated risk of the
storage of bitcoins. Appropriate IT infrastructure and corre-
sponding cyber security standards are critical for companies
nowadays, especially in consideration of the storage of con-
fidential data. As previously mentioned by Grant and Hogan
(2015, p. 32), bitcoins are digital files "with a cash value
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in the hands of the individual in possession of the file" or the
corresponding private key. However, it is still difficult to limit
the storage to the cold storage option because of the potential
threat of the files being stolen by hackers. Cold storage also
has drawbacks due to its physical nature. The recommen-
dation of Sharma (2017, 14 November) and Antonopoulos
(2015, p. 237), storing larger amounts of cryptocurrency
assets on cold wallets and using hot wallets for day-to-day
operations, seems reasonable. In this way, operational effec-
tiveness could be improved and risks would be better diver-
sified.
Independent of whether hot or cold storage method is
chosen, it is important that the administration of Bitcoin pay-
ments is properly addressed. This can be done by limiting the
access rights (to the private key or a hot wallet’s password)
to a small group of persons by assigning the responsibilities
to those with the appropriate competence. Our findings in-
dicate that, on average, two employees have the right to ac-
cess this information, which seems appropriate, but one has
to take into consideration that this analysis is mainly based
on micro- and small-businesses and the results may differ in
case of larger companies. Yet, there is no doubt that the field
of competency should be assigned to someone within the se-
nior management, preferably to someone who also has a high
level of IT knowledge, like a CDO or CTO.
Apart from the fact that the risks are evaluated as some-
what low, the results of this study also indicate that there are
currently a few companies with a significant lack of knowl-
edge about cryptocurrencies. This became apparent in the re-
spondents’ answers like "I do not know where the company’s
bitcoins are stored" and "Everybody, or an intern, has the re-
sponsibility and access rights to manage the company’s wal-
let." Additionally, the superficial risk evaluation considering
the non-usage of a payment processor raises further issues.
The answers show that the FX risk is considered as a threat
by approx. 46% of the participants, so why do they not im-
plement a payment processor that might mitigate this risk?
The last part of the analysis shows that the risks in-
volved in dealing with cryptocurrencies are generally not yet
firmly established because only around 46% of the compa-
nies claimed to have implemented internal controls in order
ensure their proper dealing. It is even more alarming that
approx. 10% of the participants were not able to assess the
compliance risks related to Bitcoin payments, and about 20%
could not evaluate if the development of internal controls is
possible in this regard. These findings support the assump-
tion that there is an important lack of know-how within
organizations.
5.3. Limitations & Suggestions for Future Research
Notwithstanding the results presented in the previous
chapters, there are some limitations to this study.
To begin with, how cryptocurrencies and their usage as
a payment method will evolve and develop cannot be antici-
pated. This is because today’s environment is highly dynamic
and constantly changing, so that it is almost impossible to de-
termine concrete rules and regulations to control a disruptive
technology like the blockchain. Therefore, the results and
the implied recommendations of this study are limited to the
current status quo.
Second, the representative nature of this study is limited
due to the selected sample, which mainly consists of micro-
and small-businesses and thus does not represent the entire
population (Brace, 2013, p. 7). This means that the re-
sults may differ for larger companies that have more complex
structures that have a considerable impact on the assigned re-
sponsibilities and the related segregation of duties concern-
ing the administration of Bitcoin funds within a company.
Furthermore, since Bitcoin payments currently only ac-
count for a small share of payments, it is important to note
that the results of a risk awareness and evaluation may dif-
fer in the future. When the share of Bitcoin payments in-
creases, it would also be required to conduct a more diligent
reflection of the involvement of payment processors and the
related costs and inherent exchange provider risks. The stor-
age of Bitcoins will especially play an increasingly important
role in this context. In addition, larger corporations located
across several countries will be faced with the question of
how to handle intercompany Bitcoin transfers because of dif-
fering national regulations and bans.
The scope of this study leaves open several options for fu-
ture research. For instance, given the criticism of Bitcoin as
a medium of exchange, future research could analyze cryp-
tocurrencies that are a more appropriate fit as a medium of
exchange, such as the zero-knowledge cryptography-based
"Zcash" or the cryptocurrency "Ripple." The results of such
studies could be used to adapt, specify, and supplement the
Cryptocurrency IC Framework and the corresponding risk
control matrix proposed.
Future studies could also adopt the opposite point of view
by determining the general properties that any cryptocur-
rency should have in order to serve as an appropriate medium
of exchange and, in particular, which risks should be ad-
dressed in the early stages of its development so as to prevent
potential threats like how to make it a more secure medium
of exchange.
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